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Abstract
What limits ought there be on a state’s ability to create a homogeneous society, to increase
or perpetuate non-diversity, or to create hierarchies within existing diversity? This article exam-
ines those questions with reference to the Lieberman Plan—which proposes to transfer populated
territories from Israel to the Palestine in exchange for Jewish settlements on the West Bank—
as an abstract exercise in demographic transformation by the state. First the article considers if
the Lieberman plan would “work”: Would it create the alterations it proposes, and would those
changes achieve a stable, peaceful, perhaps even just settlement? It finds that though there is de-
bate about the range of effect, there is little doubt that transfer would alter the state’s demography.
It then turns to the international standards that might govern the transfer of territory and the denat-
uralization of citizens, to see how they would characterize such a plan. It finds that comparisons
to ethnic cleansing are inapposite, and that norms protecting citizenship are considerably more
complex than they first appear—even allowing ethnically targeted denaturalization in some cases.
The article then analyzes the loyalty provisions of the Lieberman Plan, and notes that, contrary to
the usual normative assumption that citizenship is tied to the state, the foundations of citizenship
are actually a habitual or formative link to a given territory, which in turn creates a right to citizen-
ship not in any particular state, but in the one that incidentally is sovereign over that territory. This
interaction of citizenship and territory, when considered together with norms requiring equal pro-
tection for all citizens, suggests that the polity has an interest in defining its own territorial scope,
and thereby its membership. The legal regime is ambiguous, and therefore deliberations about this
question are in the realm of politics. The article demonstrates how transfer’s assimilation to exist-
ing norms suggests a novel interpretation of selfdetermination with far-reaching consequences for
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Stopler and participants of the “Demography and Human Rights Conference”—especially Prof.
Seyla Benhabib, Prof. Peter Schuck, and Doubi Schwartz—as well as Prof. Andrew Arato, Yael
Ronen, Michael Waters, and Rachel Guglielmo for their comments. Special thanks to Prof. Yuval
Shany, whose thoughtful engagement with this paper, both at the conference and in his written
response, provided invaluable impetus for me to reconsider and revise my arguments. Comments
to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
both sides of the conflict.
Finally, the article notes that international law, though it polices excesses, is largely silent on
the principal determinant of demography: the fact of state control over territory.
THE BLESSING OF DEPARTURE:
ACCEPTABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE STATE
SUPPORT FOR DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION:
THE LIEBERMAN PLAN TO EXCHANGE POPULATED 
TERRITORIES IN CISJORDAN
Timothy William Waters*
What limits ought there be on a state’s ability to create a homogeneous 
society, to increase or perpetuate non-diversity, or to create hierarchies within 
existing diversity?  This article examines those questions with reference to 
the Lieberman Plan—which proposes to transfer populated territories from 
Israel to the Palestine in exchange for Jewish settlements on the West Bank—
as an abstract exercise in demographic transformation by the state.
First the article considers if the Lieberman plan would “work”: Would it 
create the alterations it proposes, and would those changes achieve a stable, 
peaceful, perhaps even just settlement?  It finds that though there is debate
about the range of effect, there is little doubt that transfer would alter the 
state’s demography.  It then turns to the international standards that might 
govern the transfer of territory and the denaturalization of citizens, to see 
how they would characterize such a plan.  It finds that comparisons to
ethnic cleansing are inapposite, and that norms protecting citizenship are 
considerably more complex than they first appear—even allowing ethnically
targeted denaturalization in some cases.
The article then analyzes the loyalty provisions of the Lieberman Plan, 
and notes that, contrary to the usual normative assumption that citizenship 
is tied to the state, the foundations of citizenship are actually a habitual or 
formative link to a given territory, which in turn creates a right to citizenship 
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Rachel Guglielmo for their comments.  Special thanks to Prof. Yuval Shany, whose 
thoughtful engagement with this paper, both at the conference and in his written 
response, provided invaluable impetus for me to reconsider and revise my arguments. 
Comments to tiwaters@indiana.edu.
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not in any particular state, but in the one that incidentally is sovereign over 
that territory.  This interaction of citizenship and territory, when considered 
together with norms requiring equal protection for all citizens, suggests that 
the polity has an interest in defining its own territorial scope, and thereby
its membership.  The legal regime is ambiguous, and therefore deliberations 
about this question are in the realm of politics.  The article demonstrates how 
transfer’s assimilation to existing norms suggests a novel interpretation of self-
determination with far-reaching consequences for both sides of the conflict.
Finally, the article notes that international law, though it polices excesses, 
is largely silent on the principal determinant of demography: the fact of state 
control over territory.
The government denied that “it sought to displace 
the [existing] population…and settle another in its 
stead.”  Its goal was modernity and civilization, not 
ethnic engineering.  Yet the two were not incompatible 
and…those entrusted with the plan…assumed that 
its impact on the ethnic balance of the city was not a 
secondary consideration.
   Mark Mazower, Salonica1
INTRODUCTION—THE IDEA OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
Constructing an incontestable analysis of international law—or 
almost anything—pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a
thankless task.2  This is no less true of the Lieberman Plan, the most 
prominent proposal to swap Arab territories in Israel for Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank.  So let us approach the problem somewhat 
more obliquely—abstractly, even: Let us consider, not necessarily the 
Lieberman Plan as such—for it is too wrapped up with origins and 
outcomes, identities and positions, to be thought of in neutral terms—
but its general form, its ideal type.  What do we think, not of it, but of 
such a thing?
1 MARK MAZOWER, SALONICA, CITY OF GHOSTS: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND JEWS, 
1430-1950 306 (2004).
2 Compare the range of views on how to characterize the conflict’s military
aspects, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/arab-israel.html (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2007).
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Thus we consider the Plan as an instance of the more general 
category of actions states take to alter their demography.  There are 
many things states do, from ethnic cleansing to curricular reform; some, 
like ethnic cleansing, violate our norms and our laws, while others, 
like curricular reform, do not.  But regardless of the type of action, 
those who undertake them share the desire, or at least awareness, that 
what they do changes the balance of groups, collective categories, and 
identities in the state and its polity.
The common factor all these measures share is the aim (or effect) of 
entrenching the hegemony of one group—usually by homogenizing a 
polity’s population, but also, in certain cases, by establishing a hierarchy 
of dominance between parts of the population, or by separating them. 
And the object of interest is the majority or favored group: expulsion, 
for example, does not aim to homogenize the expelled population, but 
rather the community that remains; genocide is really about ensuring 
the purity and integrity of the perpetrators.  And so it is, in a lesser 
way, with the lesser means by which states alter their demography.
The balance of this article discusses: first, the Lieberman Plan 
itself, asking if it would achieve its goals; second, various ways 
which international law might assess or characterize the Plan, such 
as its relationship to ethnic cleansing, citizenship norms, or human 
rights; third, the certain logical, normative underpinnings of ideas 
about citizenship and the polity, and the implications of these for 
characterizing the Plan either as an exercise of sovereign democracy 
or as something else entirely different; finally, in light of these
arguments, a return to the question of the state’s role in defining
demography.  One note: I advance my argument in both a legal and 
a moral mode—by which I mean both a descriptive and prescriptive 
mode.  In many cases, I argue what I think the law should be, but 
sometimes this includes interpretations which I believe are already 
available, and logically, morally compelling, if one considers both the 
texts and the rationales of the lex lata.  And this implies nothing about 
approving or disapproving of the Lieberman Plan itself, since, as I say, 
my argument is actually about something else.
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A. THE CONTOURS OF THE LIEBERMAN PLAN 
We have established what you are, madam. 
We are now merely haggling over the price. 
      George Bernard Shaw3
To consider the relationship of an exchange or transfer4 to broader 
categories of demographic change, we first must be clear about
what this particular transfer actually proposes and what it would do. 
The Lieberman Plan—named for its principal proponent, Avigdor 
Lieberman, head of the Yisrael Beytenu party, which was part of a 
coalition government from 2006 to 20085 in which Lieberman was 
a deputy prime minister and minister for strategic affairs—calls for 
exchange of populated territories between Israel and the Palestinian 
entity, as a means to achieve a sustainable peace and ensure Israel’s 
continuation as a Jewish and democratic state.  Three Arab-populated 
areas of Israel adjacent to the West Bank would be transferred to 
Palestine, while significant Jewish-populated areas of the West Bank
would be transferred to Israel; residents of transferred territories 
would take citizenship in their new state.6  All citizens of Israel in 
its new borders, Jewish and Arab, would have to swear loyalty to the 
state.  As one analysis critical of the proposal describes the aim of the 
dual transfers, “these ‘two birds’ will, ‘with one stone,’ bring about a 
3 Sometimes attributed to Winston Churchill.
4 I use “transfer” rather than “exchange” to refer to the cession of sovereignty over 
a territory or its population or both.  Exchange implies multiple parties in a mutual 
transaction, whereas transfer can encompass mutual or unilateral acts.  In addition, 
the phrase “exchange of populations” has semantic connections to events, such as the 
Greek-Turkish exchanges, which, I argue below, are inapposite and unhelpful.  I do 
not use transfer in the sense of the forced expulsion or deportation of human beings.
5 See Mazal Mualem, Lieberman Blasts Arab MKs, Pulls Party out of Government, 
HAARETZ.COM, Jan. 16, 2008, available at  haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945299.html 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2008) .
6 The Plan does not preclude unilateral implementation, but for most of this 
analysis, I assume that it would only be implemented with the agreement of the 
Palestinian entity, which, at present, opposes the Plan.
4
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situation in which the Jewish state will have a larger Jewish majority, 
as well as benefiting from a larger piece of land for Jewish settlement
in Eretz Yisrael.”7
The Plan (like Lieberman and his party) has been subject to broad-
ranging criticisms— that it is racist, that it constitutes ethnic cleansing, 
that it is a form of apartheid8—but it has not been universally reviled. 
On the contrary, many prominent Israelis have floated the idea of
denationalization or population transfers with or without territory 
swaps (the “without” version being simply a form of expulsion), and 
these appear at all points on the otherwise fractious Israeli political 
7 SHAUL ARIELI  & DOUBI SCHWARTZ (WITH HADAS TAGARI), INJUSTICE AND FOLLY: 
ON THE PROPOSALS TO CEDE ARAB LOCALITIES FROM ISRAEL TO PALESTINE 87 (2006) 
[hereinafter ARIELI & SCHWARTZ], available at http://www.fips.org.il/Site/p_home/
home_en.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  “Eretz Yisrael” seems as problematic a 
term for the land west of the Jordan River as “Palestine.”  For convenience, I refer to 
“Cisjordan”; no political program is preferred or assumed by this.  Palestine refers to 
a Palestinian entity or state while “Israel” refers to the state of Israel, whether in their 
present borders or not; neither necessarily refers to all of Cisjordan.
8 See, e.g., Greg Myre, A Hard-Line Israeli Official, Avigdor Lieberman, Stakes
Out Extreme Positions, INT’L HER. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.iht.
com/articles/2006/12/07/news/mideast.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) (discussing 
Lieberman’s “radical plan to divide Jews and Arabs into two homogenous 
states, a proposal his Arab critics often describe as racist.”); Uri Avnery, Ehud 
von Olmert—When a Fascist Joins the Government, TIKKUN, available at http://
www.tikkun.org/rabbi_lerner/News_Item.2006-10-23.5046 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2007) (implicitly comparing Lieberman to Hitler); Akiva Eldar, Let’s Hear It 
for the Haiders, HAARETZ, Nov. 12, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/spages/780996.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (comparing Lieberman, 
unfavorably, to Jörg Haider); Arthur Neslen, Ring the Alarms, GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 
2006, available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/arthur_neslen/2006/10/
post_539.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (discussing “[t]he authoritarianism and 
racism of Lieberman’s party, especially its tub-thumping rhetoric of ‘transfer,’ a 
euphemism for the ethnic cleansing of Arabs from Israel”); Joseph Lelyveld, Jimmy 
Carter and Apartheid, 54 N.Y. REV. BOOKS Mar. 29, 2007, at 15 n.4, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19993 (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (“This aspect 
of what was called ‘grand apartheid’ [transfer to Bantustans] is echoed in the plan 
of Avigdor Lieberman….”).  You may decide for yourself: Lieberman posts blogs 
at blogcentral.jpost.com.
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spectrum;9 polls suggest broad, if inchoate, support for some form of 
the idea.10  Indeed, one other thing we must observe about the Plan, 
whatever we may think of it or its author: it is entirely consonant with 
the recent shift in thinking towards a two-state solution, and consistent, 
too, with the often anguished debate about how, if at all, it is possible 
to keep Israel both democratic and Jewish.
B. WOULD TRANSFER “WORK”?
[T]he Jews, once settled in their own State, would 
probably have no more enemies.
Theodor Herzl11
Quite apart from the legal or moral aspects we will consider, 
would the Lieberman Plan work?  “Work” in this sense consists of 
9 See, e.g., Neslen, supra note 8, at 3: (“The most worrying thing about Lieberman 
is not that his ideas exist on a plane outside Israel’s political continuum but that, in 
many ways, they are close to its dead centre.”  Noting that proposals to transfer the 
Triangle had been made in 2000 at the Herzliya conference and in 2004 by Prime 
Minister Sharon, and quoting Prime Minister Olmert in June 2006 saying “Europeans 
knew from historical memory that ‘territories were exchanged, that populations even 
moved sometimes, that territorial adjustments were made in order to create better 
circumstances for a peaceful solution’”).  See also Scott Wilson, Israel Revisited, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 2007, at D1 (discussing “new historian” Benny Morris’ 
support for a decisive demographic resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict);
Akiva Eldar, Barak Ravid, & Avi Issacharoff, Peres’ Aides Confirm Plan for PA State
on Land Equal to 100% of West Bank, HAARETZ, Aug. 9, 2007, available at http://
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/890566.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (reporting 
that “Olmert has not yet decided on his position regarding all the [Lieberman] plan’s 
clauses, but apparently has not dismissed its main ideas.”).
10 See ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7.  Support among Israeli Jews, that is; 
Israeli Arabs are generally strongly opposed to the Plan.  See, e.g., Ali Haider, Arabs 
Here to Stay: ‘Population Exchange’ Notion Leaves Arab-Israelis No Choice but to 
Seek World’s Help, YNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.
com/articles/0,7340,L-3441007,00.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
11 THEODOR HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE (1896), available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2f.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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two parts: 1) would it create the demographic alterations it proposes? 
and 2) would those changes (or whatever effects it in fact had) in turn 
achieve a sustainable, peaceful, even just settlement and preserve a 
Jewish democracy?
Some analysis will not reach these questions—or only reaches 
them as an afterthought—because it finds the Plan offensive as well
as illegal.  But let us be pragmatic, rational, cool-headed if not cold-
blooded: we should consider the Plan—imagine its workings and 
implications—before we condemn (or approve) it.
1. WOULD TRANSFER ACHIEVE ITS STATED DEMOGRAPHIC GOALS?
Lieberman proposes to ensure that Israel has at least an 80 percent 
Jewish majority.12  He claims that the transfer of areas along the 1967 
Green Line—in particular Wadi Ara and the Triangle—to Palestine 
would reduce the Arab population of Israel by up to ninety percent, 
while transferring very few Jews to Palestine.13  In exchange, Israel 
would annex most Jewish settlements on the West Bank; since the 
West Bank’s Jews and Arabs live in a complex but highly segregated 
pattern, annexation could bring territories with an almost exclusively 
Jewish population of several hundred thousand into Israel.14
12 Ronny Sofer, Lieberman Demands Population Exchange, YNETNEWS.COM, Oct. 
28, 2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3464689,00.html 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
13 See Avigdor Liberman, Israel May Have to Act Alone, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, 
Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,465769,00.
html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (interview with Lieberman).
14 Israel has already annexed areas around Jerusalem, and Jewish residents both 
there and in the settlements are already Israeli citizens, but majority opinion views 
Israel’s actions, and their presence, as illegal under international law.  See, e.g., S.C. 
Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979), at 1 (determining “that the policy and 
practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories 
occupied since 1967 have no legal validity”).  The Lieberman Plan would normalize the 
status of this territory and the Israeli citizens on it.
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Naturally, these claims are contested.  Lieberman has not supplied 
detailed maps of his proposal.  The Florsheimer Institute for Policy 
Studies (FIPS) analysis, which does include a map,15 estimates the 
affected population to be at most 228,000, or 16.3 percent of Israel’s 
Arab citizens—a number it terms “prima facie, a significant drop in
the relative number of Arab citizens”16—but argues that (because of 
likely negotiating outcomes) the actual affected population would be 
as little as 11.8 percent of Arab citizens, or only 2.3 percent of Israel’s 
population.17  The FIPS analysis does not consider the effects of more 
15 Here are two maps indicating possible transfer areas:
A. ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 
83: 
Map 2
Territory Populated by Arabs Proposed 
to be Ceded from Israel to 
Palestine
B. Uzi Arad, Trading Land for Peace: 
Swap Meet, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 
18, 2005 (also describing a multilateral 
transfer involving Egypt).
16 ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 82.
17 Id. at 82, 86.
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expansive transfers in the North District18 or the Negev, nor Arab 
areas annexed to Jerusalem.19  Still, even if a modified Plan included
these areas, it is difficult to see how any variant could reduce the Arab
population of Israel by ninety percent—Lieberman’s figure—without
also transferring significant Jewish settlements, although an eighty
percent Jewish majority—not very far from the present figure—is
presumably more achievable.
We should be clear about one thing: Neither the Plan nor any other 
transfer plan proposes a complete separation.  No one could discover 
a line that would put all Jews in Israel and all Arabs in Palestine; 
even the most artfully drawn border would leave some members of 
the “wrong” group behind.  The Plan does not contemplate transfer 
for Arab suburbs of Israeli cities, so these communities would be left 
behind—left, that is, in Israel.  Nor does the Plan put every West Bank 
Jewish settlement in Israel.20  Thus some populations would face the 
18 Most Israeli Arabs live in the North District, where they also constitute a slight 
majority.  CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL 2006, Sec. 
2.7, available at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton57/st02_07x.pdf. (last visited Nov. 
18, 2007).  Central Galilee has a strong Arab majority.  See Gil Sedan, 30 Settlements 
Planned for Negev and Galilee, THE JEWISH NEWS WEEKLY OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
Aug. 8, 2003, available at http://www.jewishsf.com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/
story_id/20778/edition_id/426/format/html/displaystory.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2007) (giving the figure as 78 percent and referring to Galilee as “a region awash
with Arabs”).
19 See The Moslem Population in Israel on the Occasion of the ‘Festival of the 
Sacrifice,’ Feb. 1, 2004, available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2004/01_04_27e.
pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (giving statistics on the distribution of Muslims in 
Israel).  See also AP, Israel Signals Possible Shift on Split Jerusalem, USA TODAY, 
Oct.  9, 2007, at 8A.  (Noting Israel officials’ suggestion to transfer parts of eastern
Jerusalem to Palestine, and Lieberman’s conditional support).
20 Lieberman has declared his willingness to evacuate his own home in the 
Nokdim settlement as part of a transfer agreement.  See Myre, supra note 8.  Nokdim 
was recently connected to the East Jerusalem suburb of Har Homa by a new road, 
popularly styled the “Lieberman Road.”  See Settlements in Focus, The Jerusalem 
9
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choice between being left behind—in a state dominated by the other 
group—or moving.21
But that is not a particularly interesting objection: it is a typical 
example of the maxim that “the perfect is the enemy of the good,” or 
here, of the possible.   Claims regarding the impossibility of drawing a 
line that separates all Arabs and Jews simply distract from the possibility 
of separating sizable populations.  Even its critics acknowledge that 
the Plan would render both states ethnically more homogeneous.  The 
demarcation of a new frontier could assign considerable, homogenous 
populations to Palestine or Israel respectively without the need for 
significant—or in theory any—population movements; these are
precisely the kinds of areas which the Lieberman Plan contemplates 
transferring.22
Times, Nov. 15, 2003, available at http://www.jerusalem-times.net/article/news/
details/detail.asp?id=4213&edition=597 (last visited Jan. 29, 2008); Jonathan 
Cook, The Dismantling Game, AL-AHRAM, July 2, 2003, available at http://www.
countercurrents.org/pa-cook020703.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
21 Not expelled of course.  There are groups that have called for expulsion of all 
Arabs across the Jordan—including parties that have been represented in the Knesset 
(such as Kach, while other parties, such as Moledet have encouraged voluntary 
transfer or denationalization of resident Arabs—see The Israeli Initiative, available 
at http://www.hayozma.org/PrinciplesSub3.aspx?lng=Eng (last visited January 30, 
2008))—but that is different from the kind of territorial transfer we consider.  Still, 
the incentives to move could amount to coercion, and it is entirely plausible that 
“informal violence” might encourage the departure of Arabs and Jews living outside 
the transfer zones.
22 The Plan does not call for any populations to move.  Still, a common objection 
to territorial revision is that populations are too inextricably inter-settled to separate, 
and that when new borders are drawn, individuals on the “wrong” side of the line will 
be subjected to violence and will must ultimately flee.  But we know this is not the
case for the West Bank, because of the barrier Israel is constructing, which shows it 
is possible to separate the great majority of Jewish settlers from the great majority of 
local Arabs.  Cf. Alistair Lyon, Near Neighbors Worlds Apart in West Bank, REUTERS, 
Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSL214
9717920070326?src=032607_0755 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  The resulting line 
may be critiqued on other grounds, but its partly completed route already describes a 
nearly total separation and a functional frontier.  Settlement patterns in Israel are much 
10
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One may also question the demographic prediction that underlies 
much support for transfer, which is the idea of an inevitable Palestinian 
majority, not only in Cisjordan, but in present-day Israel.  The FIPS 
analysis concludes that, while there might soon be a Palestinian majority 
in Cisjordan, “political separation from the Palestinians in the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem, will ensure a solid Jewish majority in 
the State of Israel even in another fifty years[,]”23 while another recent 
study anticipates a Jewish majority in all of Cisjordan except the Gaza 
Strip even without separation for at least two decades.24
Still, I do not think we need to decide between these claims.  Perhaps 
there is not a demographic shift underway, but many Israelis believe 
there is, and their proposed response is transfer.25  As for effect, the 
issue is clear enough: transfer would increase the absolute number 
and relative proportion of Jews in Israel and Arabs in Palestine, 
respectively, perhaps by a little, perhaps by a lot.  And simply imagine 
that Lieberman’s claims were accurate, or that some other scenario 
more mixed, but substantial numbers of Arabs live in areas as segregated as the West 
Bank, areas presumably as amenable to a similar line-drawing exercise.
23 ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 81.
24 See Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, & Michael L. Wise, Population 
Forecast for Israel and West Bank 2025, 6th Herzliya Conference, Jan. 23, 2006, 
available at http://www.pademographics.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (identifying 
a significant overcount of Arabs,  and predicting Jewish majorities in Israel-plus-West
Bank beyond 2025).  This estimate does not include Palestinian refugees.  If they and 
their descendants—roughly 4.3 million people registered with the UN—were counted 
as part of the relevant population—Palestinians would already constitute a majority 
in Cisjordan.   The existence of the refugees may account, in part, for recurrent 
predictions that Jews will become a minority.
25 See, e.g., Yair Sheleg, The Demographics Point to a Binational State, HAARETZ.
COM, May 27, 2004, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.
jhtml?itemNo=432222 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (discussing demographic studies 
and transfer proposals by Sergio DellaPergola of The Hebrew University). Concern 
with demography is not new: the 1976 Koenig Report discussed “thinning out” the 
Arab population of northern Israel; Pogrom at Home? TIME, Oct. 11, 1976, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946659,00.html (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2007).
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(one that sacrificed more Jewish settlements to include more Arab
ones) would achieve significantly higher numbers.26  Accepting FIPS’ 
argument that the demographic impact would be minimal simply begs 
the question: would one’s conclusions about the Plan’s legality or 
morality be any different if the impact were greater?27
Leave aside, for the moment, whether the Plan is good or not in a 
moral sense—here we deal with its effectiveness.  And there seems no 
question that—while one cannot achieve a total separation—one can 
alter the percentages quite readily.  And that is all the Plan purports to 
do—indeed, all it needs to do to achieve its own goals.  The Plan as 
a particular proposal may capture too much or too little—Lieberman 
is a Jewish chauvinist, and his proposal implicitly relies on Israel’s 
greater bargaining strength—but that in general it is possible to do 
such things, given the right demographic matrix and political will, is I 
think uncontestable.
There are many pragmatic objections to the Plan’s feasibility, but 
many of them are the incidents of politics, and politics may change. 
Better to consider the Plan’s underlying characteristics and their 
relationship to the legal and moral landscape, to see how an idea like 
this might be understood.  Objections about feasibility are really not 
based on a belief that transfer is impossible, but a conviction that it 
is undesirable.  That is a moral judgment which elides the question: 
“Could you do it?”  And I think, with the caveats noted, clearly it 
could be done.  Indeed, any Israeli Jew who has ever said, “There 
26 FIPS analysis’ assumes Israel would not cede major Jewish settlements.  That 
may be a good prediction—see, e.g., Alex Stein, Power Without Vision, THE GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/alex_stein/2006/
10/alex_stein.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (“there is absolutely no chance of 
[Lieberman’s plan] being implemented, and in his heart of hearts he must know 
that.”), but it conflates the preferential and the possible; the question is, if Israel did
commit to such a transfer, what effect might it have?  If Israel adopted a logic similar 
to disengagement from Gaza, then more Arab settlements could be transferred.
27 Since their report is called “Injustice and Folly,” one assumes their conclusions 
would not.
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ought to be a Palestinian state,” but has also said, “We will never give 
up the Jerusalem suburbs,” must think it can be done.
2. WOULD TRANSFER CONTRIBUTE TO RESOLUTION
OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?
 
The answer to this seems far less certain than to the first question. 
Even if transfer achieved a significant level of separation, it might not
actually create a more stable framework conducive to final settlement
and preservation of a Jewish democracy.28  The unilateral aspects 
of the Plan (though not essential) share the same defect as other 
unilateral proposals: they fail to draw Palestinians into a reciprocal 
relationship that addresses grievances.  And transfer might be so 
painful that it would enflame sectarian tensions: The spectacle of
thousands of Israeli Arabs—who uniformly oppose the Plan (if for 
complicated reasons29)—leaving the transfer zones, or of Jewish 
settlers rejecting Palestinian authority, might be too much for others 
to bear.  At a minimum, the Plan could increase tensions (as well as 
serious dialogue) between Jews and Arabs.  And perhaps this is what 
Lieberman secretly desires.
28 Lieberman demands that a final settlement preserve Israel’s “Jewish, Zionist and
democratic nature” and that it bring a definitive end to the conflict. Yisrael Beytenu,
The Strategic Threats—The Red Lines— Principles for the Permanent Agreement—
Introduction, available at http://www.beytenu.org/121/1252/article.html (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2008).  For some, a Jewish state is clearly seen as more central a goal than 
peace.  Cf. Ruthie Blum, One on One: It’s the Demography Stupid!, JERUSALEM POST, 
May 20, 2004 (interview with Arnon Soffer, saying “‘Unilateral separation doesn’t 
guarantee ‘peace’—it guarantees a Zionist-Jewish state with an overwhelming 
majority of Jews.... ’”).
29 See, e.g., Uri Orbach, The Right to Annoy, YNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 11, 2007, 
available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3436008,00.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2007); Nazir Majali, Arabs in Distress, HAARETZ, Aug. 17, 2007, 
available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/894494.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2007) (discussing Israeli Arab identity and affinity with Palestinian Arabs).
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But these objections, though serious, are also peripheral.  They 
might happen—perhaps their probability is enough to raise doubts 
about the Plan—but they are not the Plan itself, only side-effects and 
not even necessary ones.  Such objections have more to do with the 
desirability of transfer than its efficacy: They are objections to the
idea of separation, considering it a catastrophe in its own right—but 
precisely because of the strength of this conviction, it is hard to know 
how reliable concerns about the effects of separation are.
What is of note, I think, is that the Plan aims precisely at this kind of 
separation – one that creates a solid, secure majority of each group with 
a minimum of untrustworthy, unwanted, destabilizing, disruptive, or 
simply different members of the other community within each of two 
sovereign states.  If one objects to just such a separation, well, there 
is little more to be said; but if one does not, if one is agnostic, even 
enthusiastic—as anyone who favors a two-state solution in Cisjordan 
logically is, to some extent—it must be acknowledged that transfer 
would increase separation, and separation might in turn achieve other 
things.
Nor is it necessary to predict the Plan’s contribution in order to 
assess it.  A reasonable prospect of success is sometimes relevant 
in international law (as in measuring proportionality in the laws of 
war), and often in morality (as in theories of just war or humanitarian 
intervention), but it is not always necessary.  Many things states do are 
unwise or ultimately fail, and that risk does not make the undertaking 
illegal or wrong.  It seems reasonable to suppose that the Plan could 
achieve its stated demographic goals and in turn its political goals. 
Of course, it might not—and it might have other, unintended or 
unforeseen consequences—but no action should be judged solely on 
such grounds.
If the aim of the Plan, the means to achieve it (which are in 
effect the Plan itself), and it incidental effects are not illegal, then its 
prospects for success do little to change the analysis; after all, what 
else has “worked”?  And, again, it is entirely plausible that the Plan 
could contribute to peace, if peace could be achieved through a greater 
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separation of Jews and Palestinians.  That is, after all, the assumption 
underlying all two-state solutions, including ones advocated by people 
who despise Lieberman and his Plan.
So we should consider whether a plan such as this is not only 
possible, but legal.
I. LOCATING THE IDEA OF TRANSFER
IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Many things that are possible or effective are nonetheless illegal. 
What does existing international law say about a transfer with the 
qualities of the Lieberman Plan?30 Are there clear views, and are there 
aspects whose status is contested and unpredictable?
We may identify two broad categories of effect in the Plan, two 
candidates for international censure or approval: transfer between 
sovereigns of territory with its population, and changes to that 
population’s citizenship status.  How one characterizes the Plan—its 
methods, effects, and intentions—greatly affects one’s estimate of its 
legality, but I think the very possibility of characterizing the Plan in 
different ways may suggest why it is harder to condemn legally than 
morally, and why a moral judgment is also complicated.  Considered 
together, these two categories—norms of territory and of citizenship, 
which the Plan may or may not violate—and their characterizations 
may indicate another, deeper current.
A. TRANSFERS OF POPULATED TERRITORY
The Jews were not an accidental target for they were, 
at any rate in their traditional pattern of settlement, 
an integral part of the fabric of the Ottoman city; one 
30 Elements of the Plan probably contravene current Israeli law.  See ARIELI & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 7.  I am certainly not competent to discuss that, but I do not think 
it necessary to this analysis, which focuses on general and international norms.  I rely on 
Arieli and Schwartz’s analysis where reference to Israeli law is of interest.
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could not Westernize Salonica without uprooting the 
Jews. 
– Mark Mazower, Salonica31
1. CHARACTERIZING TRANSFER
The transfer of territory between sovereigns is not per se 
objectionable in international law, and unpopulated territory in 
particular presents no problems.32  But the essence of the Plan is to 
transfer populated territories, and to do so precisely because of their 
ethnic makeup.33  Some critics consider the Plan to be a form of ethnic 
cleansing or apartheid.34  But is this right—or rather, what must we say 
about ethnic cleansing or apartheid to assimilate the Plan to them?
The component acts of ethnic cleansing are international crimes, 
and ethnic cleansing itself may soon be identified as a customary or
conventional crime.35  But this does not tell us much about the Plan or 
31 MAZOWER, supra note 1, at 306.
32 Israeli law allows cession of unpopulated territory. ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 7, at 91 (arguing further that the seizure of land and evacuation of its population 
within Israel could be justified on national security grounds or by expropriation—with
the subsequent transfer of the now empty land.  This assumes affected individuals 
would remain citizens and move elsewhere within the state—which is precisely what 
the Plan seeks to circumvent).
33 This discussion focuses on transfer of Israel’s Arab-inhabited territories.  The 
Plan also proposes to annex Jewish-settled areas of the West Bank.  These two 
transactions are constructed as mutually compensatory.  The legality of proposals for 
the Jewish settlements seems linked to broader debates about the legality of Israel’s 
occupation; this debate is well rehearsed and utterly paralyzed. The problem of the 
Jewish settlements is less probative of the questions raised by territorial transfer, so I 
focus on the Israeli side until the final section.
34 See, e.g., Michael Lerner, Thank You, Jimmy Carter, TOMPAINE.COM, Dec. 6, 
2006, available at http://www.geneva-accord.org/Articles.aspx?docID=1533&Folde
rID=43&lang=en (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (referring to the “pro-ethnic cleansing 
Israeli Cabinet member Avigdor Lieberman”); Neslen, supra note 8 and Lelyveld, 
supra note 8.
35 Drazen Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing—An Attempt at a Methodology, 5 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 342 (1994), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol5/No3/art3.
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the broader question of states’ ability to effect demographic change in 
their territory, for to claim that the Plan is a kind of ethnic cleansing 
requires one to expand the definition of ethnic cleansing in very
curious ways. 
To the degree that “population transfer” means the movement of 
people, the Plan is not that.  The transfer envisioned by the Plan is of 
sovereignty over territory and over the people on that territory.  It should 
be clear that the Plan, taken at face value, is not of the same genus (at 
least not the same species) as the camps, demonstration killings, and 
house-to-house terror of the Yugoslav wars (which gave the world the 
phrase etničko čišćenje), the Greek-Turkish exchanges, or the postwar 
Vertreibung of the Germans.  Those exchanges accomplished transfer 
of sovereignty over populations or territory (or both) along with the 
expulsion of the resident population;36 the Plan, by contrast, leaves 
populations in situ.  So it is a mistake to condemn the Plan as being of 
that kind: there simply is no previous, recognized instance of ethnic 
cleansing accomplished by the means the Plan proposes— giving up 
sovereignty.
Nor is apartheid a useful comparison.  The criticism that the 
Lieberman Plan amounts to apartheid—despite removing Israeli 
control from Arab-populated areas—only makes sense if one equates 
apartheid with its late, declining Bantustan phase, which created semi-
sovereign states to which sovereignty over Blacks was transferred, 
in effect outsourcing South Africa’s equality problem.  One of 
the objections to the Bantustan program—apart from its bad-faith 
implementation—was that even if those quasi-states had been truly 
independent, Blacks were herded into them, cut off from resources 
html#TopOfPage (last visited Nov. 18, 2007); Roger Cohen, Ethnic Cleansing, in 
CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 136 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff 
eds., 1999).
36 The Greek-Turkish exchanges arguably did not involve territory at all: The 
Macedonian territories cleansed of Turks were already sovereign Greek territory, 
while the Anatolian territories cleansed of Greeks (really Orthodox Christians) were 
(if one ignores the Treaty of Sèvres) Ottoman and then Turkish.
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and birthplaces in a kind of ghetto, (or forced to take citizenship in a 
Bantustan while remaining in South Africa).  But the Lieberman Plan 
moves no one; it leaves people where they are and moves the borders 
around them.37
High apartheid was about the social and spatial stratification
of races within a single polity, and ethnic cleansing about forcible 
homogenization of the polity, and each is surely objectionable, but is 
territorial separation—transfer—always equally so?  Many territorial 
separations have occurred in the modern era, and not all have 
been bad.38  Historically, many legitimate separations—including 
37 Objecting to the Plan as a form of apartheid is, to say the least, a dangerous 
argument for Israeli Jews who are concerned about a demographic shift, since it is 
difficult to see why it would not also apply to the West Bank.  Cf. JIMMY CARTER, 
PALESTINE: PEACE NOT APARTHEID (2006) (arguing that Israeli policy in the West 
Bank—let alone any territorial transfer—could become a form of apartheid).  See also 
Lerner, supra note 34:
Carter does not claim that Israel is an apartheid state.  What he does 
claim is that the West Bank will be a de facto apartheid situation 
if the current dynamics…continue.  The only way to avoid Israel 
turning into an apartheid state is a genuine peace accord.
Carter points out that  he is “not referring to racism as a basis for 
Israeli policy in the West Bank, but rather the desire of a minority 
of Israelis to occupy, confiscate and colonize Palestinian land.” To
enforce that occupation….Israel has built in the West Bank separate 
roads for Jewish settlers and Palestinians, built separate school 
systems, has totally different allocations...for each population, 
wildly privileging the Jewish settlers and discriminating against 
the Palestinians.... 
Is it really true that this kind of moral objection operates only within existing 
international frontiers or cease-fire lines?  (Not, of course, that agreed frontiers even
exist in Cisjordan.)  Any two-state solution is liable to the Bantustan objection, and 
the question is only where to put the line, and why.
38 It is difficult to imagine that the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
or Norway and Sweden, for example, should be characterized as being motivated 
solely by illegitimate animus, or that the mere maintenance of separation (between the 
Netherlands and Germany, say, or the United States and Canada) is illegitimate.
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decolonization—have had a clear ethnic, religious, linguistic or other 
group-based rationale; probably almost all do, except the occasional 
island for which salt water provides reason enough.  Unless we can 
ground a general objection in some sort of animus theory—claiming 
that no action arising out of discriminatory intent is ever legitimate—
we must admit that this objection is simply its own irrational animus 
against separation.  (Even then, we would have to satisfy ourselves 
that separation is always driven by discrimination, as opposed to a 
“good fences make good neighbors” rationale.)
Apartheid and ethnic cleansing are clearly illegal, but the Plan is not 
easily assimilable to either.39  Calling the Plan, or any transfer, “ethnic 
cleansing” seems inflammatory and—more problematic—unhelpful
to thinking about what transfer actually does.40  Likewise, precisely 
because Israel’s continued occupation of the West Bank and even its 
treatment of its own Arab citizens are frequently compared to apartheid, 
the withdrawal of Israeli rule from Arab-populated territory—the very 
thing Palestinians desire in general—hardly seems like it could be the 
39 Customary international law may allow exceptions to the ethnic cleansing 
prohibition—allow, that is, certain ethnically keyed population transfers which 
are not counted as ethnic cleansing.  See Timothy William Waters, Remembering 
Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 63 
(2006) (identifying state practice allowing punitive ethnic expulsions under narrow 
conditions analogous to the postwar European context).  The German transfers 
included mass deportations and denationalizations; because these particular transfers 
remain legitimate in international law, they might indicate a zone of permissiveness.  I 
do not think this line takes one very far; however, the level of state practice approving 
the Germans expulsions is not matched for any position in the Israel-Palestine case. 
But if one wished to engage in population transfers, legally, then the German case is 
highly instructive.  Cf. Jacques Rupnik, The Other Central Europe, 11 E. EUR. CONST. 
REV. 68 (2002) (reporting Czech Prime Minister Zeman’s suggestion that Israel “break 
the deadlock with the Palestinians by adopting the method that was so ‘successful’ for 
the Czechs in 1945: expulsion.”).
40 Cf. Alex Stein, Power without Vision, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2006 available 
at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/alex_stein/2006/10/alex_stein.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2007) (“[Lieberman’s] plan is obviously illegal, immoral and anti-
democratic, although perhaps not worthy of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ tag.”).
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same thing.41  The Plan may be wrong, but surely not because it involves 
the movement of borders rather than people.  It would be a radical 
(and radically unhelpful) inflation of ethnic cleansing’s or apartheid’s
definition to extend either to projects that are prepared to sacrifice the
territory beneath the feet of the “target population”—projects that are 
prepared to withdraw, rather than drive out.
2. WHOSE APPROVAL IS REQUIRED TO TRANSFER TERRITORY?
There is no absolute bar on the transfer of territory, but what 
obligation, if any, does a state have to consult its citizens concerning 
transfer?  Does it have a special obligation towards the directly affected 
population?  (The question is a narrow one: We ask only about the 
population’s interest in territory; we turn in the next section to the 
question of citizenship.)  If so, Israel’s Arabs—who strongly oppose 
transfer—could veto the Plan.
There are certainly indications that an affected population ought 
to have some say in the disposition of its territory.  The idea, which 
we first see in the French revolutionary context, that a state’s territory
cannot be alienated without the express consent of the whole people 
and the affected populace indicates a priority of the local over the 
general, as well as some deference to the affinities of person to place.42 
However, although there is precedent for the practice of consulting 
41 Cf. Lelyveld, supra note 8, at 14ff (discussing accusations of apartheid against 
Israel by Arabs, Israeli Jews, and others).
42 The French Constitution—the locus classicus of a sovereign parliament and 
the General Will, retains this particularizing element.  See Constitution of France, art. 
53, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20VI 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (“Peace treaties...those [treaties] relating to the status 
of persons, and those that involve the cession, exchange or addition of territory, 
may be ratified or approved only by virtue of an Act of Parliament….No cession,
exchange or addition of territory shall be valid without the consent of the population 
concerned.”).
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an affected population, there is no actual obligation,43 as even strong 
proponents of the view concede: “it is unclear whether, according 
to international law, a decision on transferring sovereignty is 
conditional upon a referendum among the population in the area 
slated for sovereignty transfer....”44 Though the desire for “more 
law” is evident, the phrasing shows there is no prohibition—saying 
the law is “unclear” surely means that it is clear, just in the wrong 
direction; this is a classic case of ‘best practice’ masking mere 
preference.
Does the affected population have a right of veto over transfer of 
territory it inhabits?  The answer is clearly no: A sovereign has the right 
to transfer territory even against the population’s wishes, provided 
doing so does not violate some other right (a question to which we 
shall turn shortly).  But what if the sovereign wants to do more?  What 
if—precisely as the Lieberman Plan contemplates and desires—the 
purpose is to transfer the people too?
43 The United Kingdom has indicated it will not cede the Falklands to Argentina 
unless the islands’ population wishes.  Of course, the Falklands are an administratively 
separate unit, not integral territory of the U.K., and one can read this deference as 
an act of grace or comity.  The United Kingdom does not necessarily feel it is 
legally obliged to consult them. There are numerous instances of territorial transfer 
without consent: the entire WWI dispensation (apart from the plebiscites), the post-
WWII border changes Czechoslovakia, some parts of the USSR. In addition, in 
many cases consensual changes to borders were majoritarian, and thus significant
numbers of individuals were transferred against their will (as in Bosnia, where the 
Serb minority boycotted the independence vote).  In many colonial cases, there 
was no consultation. Of course, states are not in the habit of ceding territory; more 
common, by far, is the desire of a population to secede against the metropole’s 
wishes—and on this score states’ supposed obligation to consult the affected 
population is even less clear. 
44 ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 75 (emphasis in original).  See also infra 
note 55. 
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B. TRANSFER OF CITIZENSHIP
Wäre es da 
Nicht doch einfacher, die Regierung 
Löste das Volk auf und 
Wählte ein anderes? 
Bertolt Brecht45
The other principal effect of transfer concerns citizenship.  For 
while the land may be transferable, the Lieberman Plan also strips 
Israelis in those areas—at least Israeli Arabs—of their citizenship.  Is 
this a problem?
Whatever we may say about territory, the transfer of sovereign 
authority over the population of that territory presents a more complex 
case.46  The Arabs of Israel have been citizens since 1952;47 not 
surprisingly the principal doctrinal objection to the Plan—and all such 
proposals—grounds itself in claims about the equal rights of citizens. 
So, is denationalization a question of equal protection?  Is there a 
human right not to be deprived of one’s citizenship?
This is not a question of statelessness.  There are clear incentives 
in the international system to avoid and reduce statelessness,48 but 
45  BERTOLT BRECHT, DIE LÖSUNG (1953, published 1957) (“Would it not be easier/In 
that case for the government/To dissolve the people/And elect another?,” translation, 
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_302/ai_30324595 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007)).
46 Territorial transfers need not imply denationalization: It would be possible to 
allow the population to move elsewhere in the state and retain citizenship.  This might 
seem like a humane compromise, it might be nice to give people an option, but it is 
clear Lieberman does not want to be nice: He wants to reduce the number of Arabs in 
Israel.  An option would defeat the clear purpose of the Plan, so the question is: Is an 
option required?
47 Israel’s citizenship law defines the relevant population in a way that excludes
those Arabs who fled the territory of present-day Israel during the 1948 war.  Arabs
in areas of the West Bank annexed to Israel have the option to take citizenship under 
certain conditions; most have not done so.
48 See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 
175, see esp. art. 8 (Israel signed in 1961, not ratified); Convention relating to the
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the Plan does not render any individuals stateless; it transfers Israeli 
citizens to the sovereignty of a Palestinian state.49  So the real issue is 
whether or not a state can transfer responsibility for large segments 
of its own population to another sovereign, and if so what if any 
limitations or qualifications apply.
1. CHANGE OR REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP
States do not have absolute discretion over citizenship, and their 
discretion over withdrawal of citizenship is even more circumscribed:50 
they cannot withdraw it for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.51  Yet 
Status of Stateless Persons, Sep. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (Israel ratified Dec. 23, 
1958); International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 24 (3), Dec 16, 
1966 [hereinafter ICCPR], (“Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.”) (Israel 
signed Dec 19, 1966, ratified Oct 3, 1991); Venice Commission, Declaration on the 
Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons, art. 12, Sep. 
12-14, 1996 (CDL-NAT(1996)007e-rev-restr) (adopted at the 28th Plenary Meeting, 
Venice), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1996/CDL-NAT(1996)007rev-
e.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Venice Commission] (“The predecessor 
State shall not withdraw its nationality from its own nationals who have been unable 
to acquire the nationality of a successor State.”).
49 Again, I am assuming that the Palestinian entity cooperates.  If applied 
unilaterally—that is, if Israel denationalized citizens whom Palestine refused to 
accept—the Plan would probably violate norms on statelessness, although we will 
return to this question in the context of self-determination.
50  See James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, 
Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 321, 333 (2006) 
(“While states retain broad control over access to citizenship, the legal power to 
withdraw citizenship once granted is more limited[]” and citing Haile v. Gonzales, 
418 F.3d 798 (2005) at 4, that there is a “‘fundamental distinction between denying 
someone citizenship and divesting someone of citizenship.’”).  Normative theories of 
citizenship often rely upon a distinction between a state’s rights to regulate exit and 
to regulate entry.
51  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15, G.A. Res. 217(III), UN 
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (1) (“Everyone has the right 
to a nationality.”  (2) “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
the right to change his nationality.”).  See, e.g., LUNG CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
23
Waters: The Blessing of Departure
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
citizenship is not an absolute right: the relevant conventions allow 
states to denationalize citizens under defined circumstances.  The
“arbitrariness” element is relatively thin, requiring only that “[i]n order 
to not be arbitrary, deprivation of citizenship must be prescribed by 
law, nondiscriminatory, and accompanied by procedural due process, 
including review or appeal.”52  And the very terms of the Statelessness 
Convention indicate that large-scale transfers of populations between 
states can in fact occur.53
The most significant category of denationalizations appears in the
creation or reorganization of states.  When states divide, dissolve, 
or alter their borders, they also divide their citizenry.  This has 
happened with all the post-Cold War successions, and although each 
case adopted a different formula, all assigned citizenship based on 
individuals’ primary ties, especially through descent or geography. 
In most of those cases, pre-existing internal boundaries determined 
the assignment of citizenship; however, where entirely novel frontiers 
have been drawn—as after the First World War, or in the Indian 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000), at 175 (“general community expectations 
today would appear to be moving toward curtailing such allegedly ‘unlimited’ 
competence [to denationalize]”).
52 Goldston, supra note 50, at 333.
53 Cf. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 10, supra note 48:
(1) Every treaty... providing for the transfer of territory shall 
include provisions designed to secure that no person shall 
become stateless as a result….A Contracting State shall use its 
best endeavours to secure that any such treaty made by it with 
a State which is not a Party... includes such provisions. (2) In 
the absence of such provisions a Contracting State to which 
territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall 
confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become 
stateless”.
Such provisions would make no sense if transfers of populated territory did not 
occur. Cf. Venice Commission, supra note 48, at art. 7 (“In matters of nationality, 
[States] shall respect, as far as possible, the will of the person concerned”).
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partition—citizenship has generally followed those new divisions as 
well, directly or indirectly (through a parent’s territorial affiliation, for
example).54  Assignment has real consequences: Division terminates 
the rights of citizens to move freely about the territory of the former 
country or otherwise make claims or maintain relationships that, prior 
to the division, would have been a matter of right.  Yet in none of 
the cases has assignment been subject to approval by the affected 
populations.55
It might be objected that these are instances of state succession, 
whereas the Lieberman Plan involves the mere transfer of territory. 
But if the Plan transferred territory to Palestine by mutual agreement 
54 Cf. Victor Matthew Kattan, The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians, 74 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 67, 83-4 (2005)
The prevailing view...is that, in the case of transfer of a portion of the 
territory of a State to another State, every individual and inhabitants 
of the ceding State becomes automatically a national of the receiving 
State ...  If this is the case, is it possible to say that the inhabitants of 
part of a State which is transformed into an independent State are not 
ipso facto transformed into the nationals of that State?
A.B. v. M.B., 17 ILR 110 (1950).  Kattan, id. notes at 84 that this case was overruled 
by Hussein v. Governor of Acre Prison (1952) 6 PD 897, 901; 17 ILR 111(1950).
55 Some scholars argue for an international obligation to avoid mandatory 
denationalization.  See Liav Orgad, Yoram Rabin, & Roy Peled, Transfer of Sovereignty 
over Populated Territories from Israel to a Palestinian State: The International Law 
Perspective, 10 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (2007) [in Hebrew],  available at http://law.haifa.
ac.il/lawgov/orgad%20et%20al%20eng%20abs.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007) 
(abstract) (arguing that Israel can alter its borders but must give affected citizens a 
right of option to choose their status, including retaining Israeli citizenship); see also 
ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 75 
[T]he custom which has developed regarding a situation of 
transfer of populated territory from one state to another indicates 
that the transferring state must allow its citizens to choose between 
retaining their citizenship and/or choosing to move to territory 
remaining under the sovereignty of the state, in order to keep the 
social rights they previously enjoyed.
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in a treaty (as we are assuming), what distinguishes them?  Positing 
a doctrinal distinction between, say, the new states formed by the 
‘dissolution’ of Yugoslavia and the assignment of Austro-Hungarian 
territory to Romania seems formalistic: both cases reorganized 
sovereign control of territory and reassigned citizenship accordingly.
This means, then, that it is generally legitimate to redefine—
revoke—citizenship when states change their frontiers.56  The affected 
individuals cannot be left stateless, but so long as they are assigned to 
a new sovereign, then there is evidently no objection in principle.
(emphasis in original).  However, in none of the post-Cold War dissolutions were 
citizens given a right of option as to which successor state’s citizenship they would 
take, so this view is either wrong or universally ignored.  Perhaps it is more productive 
to ask when and why we choose to characterize a given revision of state boundaries as 
implicating concerns about citizenship, and when we do not.
56 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 657 (6th ed. 
2003); Kattan, supra note 54, at 91 n.115 (“Kunz, Oppenheim, Keith, Lawrence, 
Gettys, Fauchille, Mann, McNair, Brownlie and others have all asserted that there 
is a rule of international law that upon a change of sovereignty the inhabitants of the 
territory lose the nationality of the predecessor State and become ipso facto nationals 
of the successor State.  The Treaties of Versailles, St Germaine, Trianon, Paris and 
Lausanne are examples...”).  Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the 
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, art. 5, 1999, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/3_
4_1999.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2007) (“persons concerned having their habitual 
residence in the territory affected by the succession of States are presumed to acquire 
the nationality of the successor State on the date of such succession”); Venice 
Commission, supra  note 48:
13. a. In all cases of State succession, when the predecessor State 
continues to exist, the successor State(s) shall grant the right of 
option in favour of the nationality of the predecessor State.
... 
14. The successor States may make the exercise of the right of option 
conditional on the existence of effective links, in particular 
ethnic, linguistic or religious, with the predecessor State...  .
Cf. European Convention on Nationality, art. 20(1)(a), CETS No. 166, Nov. 6, 
1997, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/166.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2008) (“nationals of a predecessor State habitually resident in the 
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The Lieberman Plan would have a disparate impact on and implicitly 
target Israeli Arabs—its very purpose, really, is to sever the political 
linkage between them and the Jewish polity.  Moreover, most Israeli 
Arabs are strongly opposed to the Plan.57  Does that discriminatory 
intent (or Arabs’ objection) decide the matter—does this constitute a 
special objection?
Expressly discriminatory denationalization is prohibited.58 
Nonetheless, ethnicity plays an accepted role in constructing 
territory over which sovereignty is transferred to a successor State and who have not 
acquired its nationality shall have the right to remain in that State”) and (b) (“persons 
referred to in sub-paragraph (a) shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of the 
successor State in relation to social and economic rights).
57 See, e.g., Mada Al-Carmel/Arab Center for Applied Social Research, Land 
and Population Exchange Survey (conducted by S. Rouhana), 2004, available at 
http://www.mada-research.org/sru/press_release/survey_landPop.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2007) (finding that 75% of Arabs in the Triangle oppose transfer under any
conditions, and 91% expressed some opposition).  As indicated, this article focuses 
on the Israeli Arabs. Jewish settlers in the West Bank are already Israeli citizens, so 
their status would not change, and presumably most would be delighted by annexation 
to Israel.
58 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 48, at art 9 (“A 
Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality 
on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.”); International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter ICERD].  Israel signed Mar. 
7, 1966 and ratified Jan. 3, 1979), (3)(“Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted
as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, 
citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against 
any particular nationality.”) and art. 5:
(“...States Parties undertake...to guarantee the right of everyone, 
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, 
to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of...: 
...
(i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
border of the State; 
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citizenship, and states are not barred from all discrimination, let 
alone disparate impact, in granting, defining, and—most relevantly—
revoking citizenship. 
First, the general rule is that states may extend citizenship to 
whomever they please, and many states consciously construct their 
citizenry using ethnic preferences.  The EU Race Directive allows 
states discretion in applying racial distinctions in granting citizenship,59 
and EU members such as Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and 
Germany employ ethnic preferences.  Costa Rica gives preferences 
to Central Americans and Spaniards (a practice the Inter-American 
Court has approved60).  And of course Israel’s Law of Return and Law 
of Citizenship give preference to Jews.61  Other, notionally neutral 
(ii) The right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to 
return to one’s country; 
(iii) The right to nationality....”);
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
para. 14, Gen. Rec. No. 30, (“[D]eprivation of citizenship on the basis of race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach of States Parties’ obligations to ensure 
non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality.”); UN General Assembly 
Resolution, Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, 
Oct. 12, 2000, 55/153.  Cf. American Convention on Human Rights, San José, Nov. 
22, 1969, art. 20, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://
www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html (last visited January 30, 2008) 
(“2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was 
born if he does not have the right to any other nationality. 3. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.”).  (The American Convention 
does not cover the Middle East, but as we consider transfer in the abstract, it is of 
some relevance.)
59 Goldston, supra note 50, at 333 (“[T]he Race Convention[] follow[s] the 
tendency in international law more generally, grant[ing] states discretion in applying 
racebased distinctions when it comes to citizenship rules, [although] there are 
limits...”).  Neither the Directive nor member states’ practice violates international 
norms.
60 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of 
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984).  
61 The Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.), available at http://www.
knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).  See Johnathan 
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rules—language requirements, family reunification—also privilege
certain groups. 
To say that a country may give preference to some implies it may 
disfavor others—and indeed, while non-discrimination norms prohibit 
the express denial of citizenship to any particular group, if a state casts 
the prohibition more broadly or more subtly, it can effectively (which 
is to say, legally) block its target group.62  States with jus sanguinis 
norms can discourage the naturalization of groups with long-standing 
ties to the area: Japan has deployed such rules to block its Korean 
population from naturalizing,63 and Germany has long done the same 
with Turkish Gastarbeiter communities.  As one prominent advocate 
on citizenship issues notes, 
Beyond…clear-cut instances of singular, targeted 
exclusion, the boundaries of permissible state action 
Zasloff, Left and Right in the Middle East: Notes on the Social Construction of Race, 
47 VA. J. INT’L. L. 201, 207-10. Cf. Goldston, supra note 50, at 335-6 arguing that 
Israel’s creation following the Holocaust:
[L]ent legitimacy to the aim of creating and preserving a “Jewish 
state,” which might not extend to analogous citizenship policies of 
other countries.  It may reasonably be asked whether, at a certain 
point in time, the interest in preserving the unique character of the 
Jewish state will give way to the nondiscrimination norm.
 This simply demonstrates what present norms allow—and again, this is how an 
advocate against discrimination formulates the current rule.
62 The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 2003, S.H. 
544, restricts citizenship for spouses from Palestinian Authority areas; unofficial
translation available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.
htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).  CERD condemned the law (BBC News, UN 
Blasts Israeli Marriage Law, Aug. 15, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle_east/3152651.stm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008)), but it was upheld by the 
Israeli Supreme Court. Jonathan Cook, “Israel’s Marriage Ban Closes the Gates 
to Palestinians,” ZNet, May 25, 2006, available at http://www.zmag.org/content/
showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10321 (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
63 See, e.g., Choung Ill Chee, Japan’s Post-War Mass Denationalization of the 
Korean Minority in International Law, 10 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 19 (1982).
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are not always clear.  Race-based distinctions that 
expressly bar access to citizenship for some racial or 
ethnic groups should be considered presumptively 
invalid, absent particular evidence showing that they 
are both necessary and proportional to the specific,
legitimate purpose at issue.64
The general rule prohibits ethnic exclusions, but in particular 
cases it can allow them, requiring only some plausible rationale. 
In practice, states have considerable leeway to identify “necessary 
and proportional” reasons, and in the great majority of cases, it is 
states themselves, not some notional “international community” or 
international adjudicative mechanism, that determine if those reasons 
are acceptable.
Of course, granting citizenship is one thing, revocation quite another: 
Neither preference nor discrimination in the granting of citizenship 
necessarily implies anything about the rules on when citizenship can 
be revoked.  They do indicate, however, that ethnicity is a recognized 
and legitimate factor in the construction of citizenship—and turning 
to withdrawal of citizenship, we find that ethnicity plays a discernible
role there as well.
There have been limited instances in which ethnic denationalization 
has been carried out without censure—arguably, these simply constitute 
unpunished violations, but it is equally plausible to characterize them 
as data points in defining the contours of law in practice.  For example,
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire stripped ethnic 
Banyamulenge and northern Muslims, respectively, of citizenship; 
64 Goldston, supra note 50, at 334 (emphasis added) (arguing, at 333, that “[t]he 
clearest cases of unlawful discrimination in access to citizenship involve state policies 
that single out particular racial or ethnic groups for invidious treatment.  These should 
be viewed with skepticism, and, as a general rule, disfavored”).  Even this formulation 
speaks only of “skepticism” and “disfavor as a general rule,” because state practice 
does not support more.
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Mauritania similarly expelled black “Senegalese” in the 1980s.65 
In these cases the state claimed that the individuals had never been 
citizens, and thus technically they were not denationalizing them,66 but 
this merely serves to indicate a particular strategy that is successful 
—construct a restrictive definition of citizenship to exclude the
target community—and to demonstrate the pliability of general non-
discrimination norms applied to particular cases. 
Similarly, the peacetime denationalization of German citizens of 
Czechoslovakia after the Second World War has never been criticized; 
on the contrary, in the controversy surrounding the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the EU, its legality has recently been reaffirmed in court
cases, demarches, and interstate negotiations.67  Finally, in cases of 
state succession, there has often been an irreducible ethnic element, 
even when independence tracked internal boundaries; in Estonia and 
Latvia in the 1990s, efforts were made to base citizenship for those 
who had become resident during the Soviet era on language ability or 
knowledge of history-stratagems that effectively denationalized most 
Russians.68
Indeed, there may be good reason why discriminatory intent or 
disparate impact standards are particularly restrained when the actus 
involves reconfiguration of frontiers: The reasons for the momentous
decision to reconstitute a state are irreducibly complex—involving 
questions of economics, history, social psychology, politics, short and 
long-term calculations of an almost infinite variety—and few such
changes are not marked, in some way, by ethnic difference.  A disparate 
65 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 82 (1995).
66 Id. at 82 (“The Mauritanian government denied expelling any of its nationals. 
It claimed that the blacks who were expelled did not qualify as Mauritanians because 
their ancestors came from Senegal.”)
67 See Waters, supra note 39, at 80-115.
68 Proposals to expel all ethnic Russians who had arrived since the Soviet 
occupation were resisted by the Council of Europe and the EU, but the Baltic states 
were largely successful in defining most of these “new Russians” as non-citizens, and
have succeeded in significantly reducing the Russian share of the citizenry.
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impact standard would effectively prevent any border changes; the 
most cursory glance at the post-Cold War era suggests such a standard 
cannot possibly describe our law and practice.
There is also an evidentiary problem: The practical difficulties
in pinning down intent make successful invocation of formal anti-
discrimination rules problematic.  It would be very easy to describe 
the transfers the Plan proposes in purely geographic terms—residents 
of areas defined by longitude x and latitude y—without any mention
of Arabs.  Even if one imagined anti-discrimination norms reached 
this far, there would still be the practical problem of making the claim 
stick;69 a state that can present a plausible, facially valid alternative 
probably will escape censure.70  This is little point in just hammering 
on doctrine—especially as, in this case, the doctrinal case is weak—
without acknowledging its predictive, evidentiary limits.71 One might 
prefer a disparate impact threshold for invoking non-discrimination 
norms,72 but in practice such norms “serve[ ] primarily to place a modest 
69 For example, the FIPS analysis asserts that broad revocation of citizenship 
meets with universal disapproval, citing cases from Peru, East Timor, and the Czech 
Republic (ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 90, n.164, quoting “Revocation of 
Citizenship,” Senate, information page no. 187, Oct. 2002 [in Hebrew]). However, 
international law has actually effectively acceded in or approved at least two of 
these examples: Czech denial of citizenship to Roma and Indonesian revocation of 
Timorese citizenship.
70 Cf. Goldston, supra note 50, at 334-5 (“It is often hard to divine the dividing line 
between, on the one hand, a legitimate state interest in retaining the loyalties of and 
connections to emigrants to other lands, and, on the other, an illegitimate aspiration for 
ethnic purity.”  Goldston is referring here to naturalization, not denationalization).
71 It should be clear from this that I am siding with those who say that, in international 
law, we cannot simply insist on rules without reference to practice.  Beyond some point, 
it is a meaningless exercise to construe patterned, systemic, and systematic behavior as 
violations of some abstract norm, rather than as indications of a different, less desirable 
rule.  The moral faculty may always object, but the legal, not.
72 Goldston, supra note 50, at 334-5: 
In practice, the test should be drawn from the nondiscrimination 
norm....  As in the field of nondiscrimination, once a disparate
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burden on the state to come forward with a plausible justification for
any distinctions drawn in law or practice.”73
Thus while Israeli law may not allow ethnic denationalization74 
(although allowing ethnically keyed naturalization and denying 
citizenship to Palestinian refugees), there is scope in international 
law for a more, shall we say, robust approach—supposing one wanted 
such an approach, as the Lieberman Plan does.  International law may 
prohibit the expressly discriminatory targeting of ethnic groups for 
denationalization, but it does not prohibit the denationalization of the 
inhabitants of a given piece of territory.  While one might think that 
the underlying discriminatory intent—so evident in the Plan—poisons 
and invalidates the act, there is little support for this proposition in 
international law.
Whatever the doctrinal claim, it seems plausible that the Plan—or 
something like it—is assimilable to international legal norms: There 
is no absolute right not to be denationalized, and formally the Plan 
constructs the category of candidates for denationalization on a basis 
which may avoid equal protection or discrimination concerns.  The 
impact is shown, the burden should in practice be on the 
government to demonstrate both a legitimate aim and a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim pursued.
73 David A. Martin, The Authority and Responsibility of States, in MIGRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 34-5 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 
2003).
74 ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 65 (listing three grounds for denationalization 
in Israeli law, none relevant to the Arabs). Israel’s Supreme Court and Government 
have found that “revocation of citizenship is a drastic and extreme act which should be 
avoided” (Id. at 66) and would violate several Basic Laws (Id. at 67, citing Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/
laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) and Basic Law: Freedom 
of Occupation 1994, S.H. 90, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/
basic4_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).  But these are artifacts of municipal law, 
which can be amended; we concern ourselves here with the international norms in the 
context of which Israel’s municipal law operates.
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Plan uses territory as a proxy for ethnicity, and this may be enough 
cover to avoid the highly general prohibitions of discrimination. And, 
as we shall see, the objections of Israeli Arabs may not matter either.
3. HARM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Even if there is no foundational objection based on discriminatory 
animus, the Lieberman Plan might nonetheless fail the legal test if it 
violates the human rights of the transferred population.  The analytical 
approach of the Plan’s critics (such as the FIPS report) assumes that 
the opposition of Israeli Arabs to transfer measure is a decisive legal 
obstacle, and in particular that harm to those Arabs from loss of 
citizenship—decline in living standards; separation from the networks 
around which they have organized their lives; division of the Israeli 
Arab minority; and the simple, direct insult of denying their common 
identity as Israelis—constitutes a clear and compelling objection to 
transfer.  Perhaps the sum of human rights creates an effective bar 
to involuntary change of citizenship: The very logic of harm—that 
these Arabs would be injured simply by being cut off from the rights 
of citizenship they enjoy as Israelis—presupposes the answer as to 
whether or not they can be cut off. 
Yet harm is not so easily cabined; if being cut off from the blessings 
of citizenship were a per se harm, then many suffer for whom rights 
contemplate no remedy.  I am not entitled to the rights of an Israeli 
citizen—I suffer that exclusion—but that is not a harm Israel intends 
to answer.  Why not?  Because I am not a citizen?  More precisely, 
because I do not live in the confines of the state of Israel75—oh 
75 Israel’s Declaration of Independence calls on “the members of the Arab people 
who live in the State of Israel to keep the peace and take part in the building of the 
state, on the basis of full and equal citizenship” (cited in ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 7, at 90).  Territorial and citizenship transfer is not inconsistent with that call, 
which is limited to those Arabs “who live in the State of Israel” (thus excluding “those 
who had lived in what has become the State of Israel”).  Expulsion would violate that 
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yes, and because I am not a Jew who can claim that right.  Of more 
relevance, Israel has never offered citizenship to any 1948 refugee 
willing to return despite their obvious affinities to the territory.76 
How does one combine the rock-solid solicitude for the civic rights 
of Israeli Arabs—to those Arabs who happen to be Israelis—with an 
adamantine refusal to extend citizenship and its protections to others 
with an equal attachment to the same land?  The harm to Israeli Arabs, 
in other words, is itself a construction of the citizenship right in a given 
territory, which in turn is a construction of the polity, of the people of 
the state of Israel exercising its rights as a sovereign.77
covenant, but transfer of territory might not: If the state of Israel legitimately expands 
or contracts, its relationship to the populations under its authority changes.  Territorial 
transfer is not the stripping of citizens within Israel, it is the withdrawal of Israel from 
control over a territory and its population—a direction many Arabs, at least in the 
occupied territories, have long said they desire.  (Nor do I think that the exceptional, 
wartime circumstances of Israel’s founding have any bearing on this question.  The 
language of the Declaration, echoed in subsequent texts, is fully consistent with 
peacetime application—and in any event Israel’s citizenship law was not drafted until 
1952, after the termination of active hostilities.)
76 Technically, Israel has never denied the possibility for refugees to return provided 
they meet certain criteria—loyalty criteria—but it has consistently denied that they 
have a right to return, or to citizenship; in the event, almost no Palestinian refugee has 
ever actually been admitted.  Cf. Steven Erlanger, Olmert Rejects Right of Return for 
Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A1 (noting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s 
declaration that Israel would not allow even a single refugee to return and denying 
that Israel was responsible for their flight); Sean Gannon, Who’s Afraid of Resolution 
194?, ISRAELINSIDER, Aug. 22, 2003, available at http://web.israelinsider.com/Views/
2654.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (arguing that General Assembly Resolution 194 
does not create a right of return). The private Geneva Initiative acknowledges the 
principle, but leaves the number to Israel’s discretion: Under the Geneva formula, it 
would be entirely acceptable for Israel to admit no returnees.
77 The objection that transfer would destroy Israeli Arabs’ group identity seems 
problematic, because the construction of Israeli Arabs as an “ethnic group” is a function 
of (highly contested) borders.  I count four classes of Palestinian with significant
links to Cisjordan: Israeli Arabs, Arabs in annexed Jerusalem, residents of the West 
Bank and Gaza, and ’48 refugees with their descendants.  There are few meaningful 
differences between these classes other than what Israel has created—indeed, the 
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The entire obstacle disappears if one contests the linkage between 
citizenship, harm, and rights.  Transfer does not harm any Israeli Arab’s 
human rights, however much it may harm his interests or offend his 
preferences, because no one has the right to live in a particular state 
with particular borders.  All supposed violations concern rights that 
either are constructed by a particular grant of citizenship, or are of 
universal application and thus unaffected by transfer.
Many civil and political rights (such as voting or freedom of movement) 
have no single universal application, but only particular civic instantiations: 
they are given expression within the particular territory within which one 
has citizenship or residency.78  One’s political rights in a given polity 
exist only as long as the territory to which one is affiliated belongs to that
polity—today, for example, a Latvian has no right to move to Siberia, 
even though 20 years ago, as a Soviet citizen, he did.  So long as one is a 
citizen one can go anywhere, live anywhere, but when territory is divided, 
states determine citizenship based on place of birth, parents’ place of birth, 
current or present residence, and so forth, and redefine individuals’ rights
claims accordingly.  When we consider a state’s territorial reformation, 
we confront the territorial roots of citizenship.79
classes themselves are creatures of Israeli law—and yet they have radically different 
status.  It seems circular to say that a state’s shape and identity cannot change because 
of the interests of an ethnic group whose identity is solely a function of that state.
78 As I noted, I have no right to freedom of movement in Israel—or even to 
enter Israel—but I have those rights in the United States, in which I hold citizenship 
(because I was born to U.S. citizens and on its territory).
79 Thus the Lieberman Plan would not violate freedom of movement or the right 
to enter or leave one’s own country (such as ICCPR, supra note 48, at art. 12(1-2, 4); 
ICERD supra note 58, at art. 5(i-iii)), because, if the transfer were otherwise valid, 
then although the subject population would no longer be in Israel or citizens of it. 
One’s right to freedom of movement is satisfied by its expression within whatever
polity one belongs to; nothing in that right requires that the polity never change its 
territorial composition. Consider that when a state acquires territory, human rights 
naturally indicate that the state’s citizens—old and new—have the right to move 
freely about the expanded state.  That is the logic when land is gained; when land is 
lost, there is a symmetrical logic.
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Human rights norms of universal application (such as general 
bodily integrity norms like the right not to be tortured), on the other 
hand, are identical in every state precisely because of their universal 
nature, and thus transfer is trivial with respect to them, as the same right 
obtains regardless of who the sovereign is.  Israeli Arabs transferred 
to the sovereignty of a Palestinian state would have the same human 
rights they have now, and thus the new sovereign would have the same 
obligations Israel now has towards those them.80  It is difficult to see
how transfer constitutes a human rights violation in that context.81 
Thus the rights violated here are civil rights, defined in the Israeli
municipal context, and their possession and enjoyment is a function of 
citizenship.  If citizenship can be terminated by any valid means, rights 
dependent upon citizenship terminate too; if transfer is otherwise valid, 
the claims of citizenship cannot be raised against it.  It is circular is to 
assert that citizenship can never be changed because doing so would 
constitute harm to citizenship rights: unless there is an external, human 
rights based objection, citizenship cannot be its own rationale.  We 
have some form of right to live where we do and to claim membership 
in the polity controlling that land—but that does not create a veto over 
changes in the polity’s shape.
80 Transferees would lose access to Israel’s health care and social services.  But an 
objection based on harm to Israeli Arabs’ standard of living ignores the great variation 
in state practice that can satisfy rights norms: Levels of services that might be deemed 
unacceptable in Israel would be perfectly adequate in many countries, and would 
not raise rights concerns.  (I do not think the real risk doctrine is apposite to cases of 
territorial revision; I discuss why in the rebuttal.)  Moreover, this objection depends 
on the incidental fact that conditions in Palestinian areas are worse than in Israel. 
There is something paternalistic in this objection, and ironic, since it implies that 
compelling an Israeli to live in the occupied West Bank would constitute a human 
rights violation.
81 Even asylum rights—which imply a right of movement across international 
borders—necessarily require some other violation precedent to become active; unless 
transfer otherwise violated human rights, it could not give rise to a right to asylum. 
(Thanks to Prof. Seyla Benhabib for raising this issue.) 
37
Waters: The Blessing of Departure
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
There is a unquestionably harm: Replacing second-class citizenship 
in a wealthy, rights-respecting society with the poverty, violence, 
and degradation of the occupied West Bank is hardly a matter of 
indifference, which is presumably why Israeli Arabs oppose it.  But that 
harm, while morally important, does not necessarily implicate rights. 
Individuals often find themselves on one side or another of a new line,
and they may not have a choice, but rather have their options dictated 
by where they live or where they have meaningful connections.82
If this were not so—if the harm arising from loss of civic connection 
were an absolute obstacle—then we would have to prohibit any 
82 How does one determine those links?  Suppose I am an Israeli who moved 
to Wadi Ara yesterday, and today its severance is announced; am I denationalized? 
What if I plan to move, but have not yet done so?  Perhaps I have bought a house—
and sold my old one in Tel Aviv—but I have not yet moved in (I may have stopped 
to visit relatives in Haifa, and I don’t live anywhere yet).  It would seem unjust to 
deprive someone of citizenship on such thin grounds. The answer, I think, is that these 
problems arise any time territory changes hands.  The Czechoslovak divorce created all 
manner of complicated situations; the dissolutions of the USSR and Yugoslavia made 
those look simple by comparison.  In none of these cases was the enormous project of 
denationalization—for that is what each was—delegitimated by its complexity.  Cf. 
European Convention, supra note 56, at art. 18(2):
In deciding on the granting or the retention of nationality in cases 
of State succession, each State Party concerned shall take account 
in particular of: (a) the genuine and effective link of the person 
concerned with the State; (b) the habitual residence of the person 
concerned at the time of State succession; (c) the will of the person 
concerned; (d) the territorial origin of the person concerned.)
Concerns about who is affected—an infant whose mother is from Umm el Fahm 
and father from Netanya or a thousand other scenarios—occur in any transition, and 
working them out is inevitably painful, protracted, and possible.  They keep lawyers 
occupied, but do not deflect the main enterprise.  People are forever moving, marrying,
divorcing, buying property, selling it, and generally creating complex identities, 
networks, and histories that don’t fit neatly within any existing or possible political
geography.  The wonder is that we ever imagine they would fit, or ever design a
system, such as the present one, on the assumption that they do. Our analysis must 
free itself from a priori assumptions about which is the “correct,” default constitution 
of citizenship for a given territory.
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territorial revision, because every revision limits citizens’ ability to 
exercise their civic rights in the whole territory. How then could we 
explain the universally admitted legality and legitimacy of the many 
secessions or dissolutions that have occurred since the end of the 
Cold War?  Even in those cases in which the seceding part wished to 
leave (as Israeli Arabs do not), the majority in the residual state was 
surely harmed in exactly the same way that Israeli Arabs are harmed: 
their patterns of circulation and civic connection were disrupted by 
secession, their links as a collective community severed, their common 
identity denied.83  Yet no one has ever objected to the reshaping of 
these states or to their circumscribed redefinition of citizenship on
such grounds.
This does not mean human rights are subordinated to the state, or 
that rights have no meaning.  Certainly, the way in which a transfer 
is conducted could violate human rights, and then it would be illegal. 
The core question, however, is whether or not a transfer as such is a 
violation, simply because it is opposed by those affected and causes 
them real harm.  Having in mind the relevant standards and state 
practice, we must conclude that transfers of citizenship consequent 
to territorial revisions do not in and of themselves violate any human 
rights, which are quite simply not implicated by the transfer of territory 
as such.84
83 The Security Council is currently considering the partition of Serbia (which is 
a fair characterization of Kosovo’s independence) although a discrete minority of the 
affected population is opposed.  And under a harm analysis, the whole population of 
Serbia is harmed by the loss of its common space.  (There is another reason for this 
intervention—Serbia’s acts of ethnic cleansing—but the argument holds true for any 
secession or dissolution.)
84 If one believed that human rights were violated by transfer, then it would 
perhaps make sense to engage in a balancing calculus, in which the scope of transfer 
and its exigent justifications would weigh against the quantum and quality of harm to
rights.  However, because my view is that human rights are not necessarily implicated 
by transfer of citizenship linked to territorial transfer, there is no need to balance. 
In this same light, debates about exactly how many Arabs transfer might affect are 
ultimately beside the point.
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This much we can derive simply by observing the standards and 
state practice.  But the rationale is, as yet, un-theorized: Why is it that 
citizenship is fungible in this way—that is, in relationship to territory? 
After all, one has citizenship in a state, not in a piece of land, so where 
does this idea that one’s citizenship—one’s relationship to the state, 
even one’s civic identity—tracks with territory, derive from?  We 
can approach the rationale by considering the other element of the 
Lieberman Plan: the loyalty oath.
4. LOYALTY
On the evacuation boats was also almost the whole 
of the Algerian Jewish community.  To many who 
had sympathized…their expulsion at the hands of the 
Muslims came as a cruel shock.  “Why are you making 
us leave, because after all we are your friends?” the 
Ankaoua family asked their Muslim neighbors. 
“Then we locked the door, taking the key with us.  We 
thought we might be able to return….”
Over a hundred thousand Algerian Jews, many of 
them impoverished, backward, and disease-ridden, 
poured into metropolitan France.
Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace85
In addition to transfers of sovereignty over territory and their 
populations, the Plan calls for all individuals who remain in Israel 
after the territorial swap to take an oath of loyalty; those who refused 
would only have permanent resident status.86  Though the oath would 
85 ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954-1962 532-3 (1977, 
2006).
86 See http://www.yisraelbeytenu.com (“A New Citizenship Law”); Greg Myre, 
A Hard-line Israeli Official, Avigdor Lieberman, Stakes Out Extreme Positions, INT’L 
HER. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/07/news/
mideast.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  Recently Yisrael Beytenu has emphasized 
the loyalty oath more than transfer.  See Gershom Gorenberg, The Minister for 
National Fears, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2007, at 84.
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87 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH 
PRACTICE 302-11 (1827); JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 552, § 2291 (John 
T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
88 Arabs can volunteer to serve in the IDF but are not required to serve, as Jews 
and Druze are.  Central Intelligence Agency (USA), “Israel,” THE WORLD FACTBOOK 
(2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
print/is.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).  Even Israeli Arabs’ opposition to transfer does 
not suggest an identity of interests, or anything else, with Israeli Jews.  Most Israeli 
Arabs also oppose many things which most Israeli Jews consider essential to their 
state project, such as the Law of Return and the Jewish nature of the state.  Most Israeli 
Arabs, like Arabs everywhere, refer to the events known to Jews as the Independence 
War as the Nakba.  Cf. Elie Rekhess, The Future Vision of the Palestinian-Arabs 
in Israel, TEL AVIV NOTES, Dec. 19, 2006 (discussing broad support among Israeli 
Arabs for initiatives like the National Council of the Heads of Arab Local Council’s 
“Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel”); Alexander Yakobson, Who is a 
Palestinian?, HAARETZ, Aug. 18, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/894493.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007)  (“Though it could be said that the 
Arabs in Israel belong to the Israeli people, the “people” in this context means a civic 
community (that people to which we all refer when we say that the Knesset is elected 
by the people) and not a shared national identity.”).
cover Jews as well, it is clearly intended for Arabs who remain in 
Israel.
This runs counter to international law’s increasing tendency to view 
citizenship as a right automatically afforded to natural residents; whether 
a state adopts jus soli or jus sanguinis rules or some combination, 
citizenship is supposed to be an automatic right for the relevant 
population, not one subject to further tests.  Nor does requiring the oath 
of everyone necessarily cure this objection: such a requirement is like 
Bentham’s argument against evidentiary privileges, that only the guilty 
need them and so innocent citizens will not object to testifying;87 in 
practice, Jews—like the innocent—will find it easier to take such an
oath.  Indeed, the rationale for assuming the loyalty of Jews but not 
Arabs is fairly obvious, even if one rejects it.  In fact, anyone who accepts 
the existence of the “problem” of keeping Israel both democratic and 
Jewish, necessarily understands and in some form accepts the rationale: 
that a Jewish state cannot be certain about the loyalty of Arabs.88
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International law disfavors loyalty oaths from natural citizens. 
But is it not problematic to pretend that loyalty is not an issue in 
constructing the polity?  All citizenship is implicitly based on loyalty: 
In fact, despite the apparent trend towards “automatic citizenship,” 
mere residence does not suffice to rationalize citizenship norms without
resort to some underlying concept of affinity between the individual
and the state polity, of precisely the kind the Lieberman Plan and all 
two-state plans for Cisjordan are premised upon.
For example, efforts to reduce statelessness have centered on long-
term residence—notionally a territorial standard—but have done 
so because residence creates connections and affinities between the
individual and the state.  In the Nottebohm case, the International 
Court of Justice found that the basis for citizenship was a “genuine 
and effective link” determined by the “habitual residence of the 
individual concerned but also the centre of interests, his family 
ties, his participation in family life, attachment shown by him for a 
given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”89  Nottebohm is 
normally read as pushing states to grant citizenship to a broader class 
of individuals: “Nottebohm as refined by the developing principle
of democratic participation would override the power of exclusion 
implicit in the community’s right of self-determination.”90  This is a 
plausible reading, but taking Nottebohm on its own terms, the link 
between an individual and the state which motivates that broader 
claim goes beyond territoriality to include shared values or identity—
a community sharing more than physical proximity.91
89 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6), at 23; see 
also 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 396, 399-400 (1955).
90 Goldston, supra note 50, at 341.
91 Cf. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution 
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), 
(“[I]t would not appear to be inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the grant of 
nationality to expedite the naturalization procedures for those who, viewed objectively, 
share much closer historical, cultural and spiritual bonds”).  See also Sisojeva and 
Others v. Latvia [GC], Eur. Ct. H.R. no. 60654/00 (2005) (finding applicant had a
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Because states normally may not demand that natural citizens 
who otherwise meet the criteria for citizenship demonstrate proofs of 
allegiance as the price of admission, the Lieberman Plan’s loyalty oath 
almost certainly violates international law.92  But the idea of loyalty, 
problematic as it is, brings us squarely before the core issue, which is 
the rationale for legitimated domination of a particular territory by a 
particular community—and the rights and claims that may create in 
the communities and individuals dwelling in that land.
II. TRANSFER AS SOVEREIGN DECISION OR
SELF-DETERMINATION: COMMUNITY AND TERRITORY
The arrival of every individual is a source of richness 
for us; and the departure of every individual is a 
blessing for us!
Turkish deputy to the Ankara assembly, during 
the population exchanges93
We have seen that citizens cannot be deprived of citizenship on 
discriminatory grounds (with important qualifications), but also that
a change affecting all citizens living on a given territory could be 
understood differently.  The deeper, foundational question concerns the 
relationship of community to the disposition of territory, and therefore 
the international normative framework in which such dispositions 
right to residence in Latvia due to long-standing ties); Slivenko v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
no. 48321/99, para. 95 (2003) (“some importance [is] attached in [cases of expulsion 
brought under Article 8 ‘private life’] to the degree of social integration of the persons 
concerned.”); Dilicia Yean and Violeta Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (2005) (finding applicants had right to citizenship under jus soli norms).
92 It might seem strange that international law forbids loyalty oaths yet allows 
the state to denationalize individuals, but the difference is that transfer changes 
citizenship as a consequence of a change in the sovereign reach of the state. 
The underlying motive can be the same, of course, and to some that is all that 
matters.
93 Quoted in MAZOWER, supra note 1, at 323.
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are negotiated is particularly pertinent.  This is especially true in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case.
Several points can be synthesized from the observations made so 
far: Taken together, they indicate both the doctrinal path by which 
a transfer like the Lieberman Plan might be understood, and an 
alternative way of understanding it that, though heterodox, may better 
explain and motivate what is happening in Cisjordan, or rather what 
is not happening.
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE POLITY
1. COMMUNITIES OF PLACE EXIST APART FROM THE STATE
The international texts on citizenship barely contemplate the 
territorial construction of the polity.  They are largely focused 
on statelessness—the risk that individuals will be expelled from 
the state or cast adrift inside it94—because they understandably 
assume that states are not usually in the business of giving up their 
territory.  But in transfer, denationalization occurs as a consequence 
of territorial cession: It is precisely because individuals ought not be 
moved about and ought to have some say in the governance of their 
homes—because we believe in a Heimatrecht—that territorial transfer 
also implies transfer of citizenship. The link between individual and 
state is mediated through connection to place; so must this link be 
expressed by the existing state, or does the logic of place suggest other 
expressions are possible?
A claim based on habitual link draws its strength from the 
formative effects on identity of residence in a particular place.95 
94 Cf. Partial Decision on Admissibility, Makuc and Others v. Slovenia, Eur. 
Ct. Hum. Rts. no. 26828/06 (2007); Written Comments on the Case of Makuc and 
Others v. Slovenia, Application no. 26828/06, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE (2007) 
(submission to the European Court of Human Rights).
95 A case could be made that the right attaching to one’s particular locality is more 
fundamental than the right of free movement within a given state, or indeed all other 
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Affinity to place implies a community—a political community—other
than the state.  Might it not follow then that the individual’s claim is 
to citizenship in whatever state claims sovereignty over that place, 
rather than in a particular state?96  At the same time, the idea of pre-
existing communities with interests in preserving their identities and 
values motivates a state interest in controlling demography, in order 
to preserve itself.
Thus we have a claim and an interest: The individual with a 
claim to citizenship in the state governing the place he lives, and 
the community with an interest in preserving itself and thus in the 
loyalty of the whole citizenry.  The individual’s claim we construe as 
a nearly automatic right so long as his habitual residence is within the 
state, while the community’s interest is constrained by norms—about 
human rights, non-discrimination, loyalty oaths—and the obligation 
to afford citizenship to all people with genuine links to the territory, 
even though those links indicate bonds to communities and places, 
rather than to the state as such.
aspects of the citizenship right, because all those are derivative of the right derived 
from being (belonging) in a particular place.  A child born in Umm el Fahm is a citizen 
of Israel because Umm el Fahm is in Israel.  If it were in another country, he would be 
a citizen of that country.  We know this because of two processes: a) the Statelessness 
Convention requires, when territory is transferred, that the new sovereign makes 
all who live there citizens, rather than expel them to the ‘old country;’ and b) the 
rationale in Nottebohm (supra note 89) grants citizenship to individuals by virtue of 
their formative ties to a place.
96 This is not to suggest that an individual only has a claim in his birthplace: Once 
someone claims citizenship by whatever means, international law clearly protects that 
person’s to move freely about his own country.  Rather, this means that citizenship 
is constructed through claims about links to a particular territory, from which a more 
general right of citizenship applicable in the whole political space is constructed. 
When a state is divided, any individual’s claim to citizenship in a particular part of the 
country is implicitly based on a version of Nottebohm’s logic (supra note 89)—that 
the individual, through exercise of his right to move about, has put down roots in a 
place, and should have the citizenship of that place’s new sovereign.  It is the link 
to place that creates the claim to citizenship in the body politic to which that place 
belongs.
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2. EQUALITY DOES NOT DICTATE THE SHAPE OF THE STATE 
 
What this suggests is a distinction between the regulation of 
relationships within the state and regulation of the state’s formation and 
shape.  Human rights set a common minimum for all human beings—
in effect, an equality principle—which the state internalizes as civil 
rights.  But rights do not dictate a particular political dispensation—
they do not dictate the shape of any polity.  Human rights norms, like 
international law more broadly, treat change in territorial sovereignty 
as a political question;97 indeed, the normative strength of rights 
comes precisely from their universality, and it follows that rights 
are indifferent to the particular forms states take.  In that sense, 
international norms regarding citizenship are not constitutive of—or 
even terribly interested in—any given state as a territorial entity; they 
merely indicate what the quality of interactions within any given state 
must be.98
2. THE NEED FOR A COMMON CIVIC VISION
And precisely because there is an internal equality principle and 
human rights (increasingly) demands citizenship for all individuals 
with links to the territory of the state, it is pragmatically essential that 
97 International law prohibits certain modalities of transfer, such as aggression, 
but not the act itself.  In limited circumstances (colonialism, genocide) human rights 
justifies enforced territorial reorganization.
98 Cf. art. 27, ICCPR, supra note 48 at art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language”).  This is an equality rule, not a rule constructing the polity: “In those states 
in which minorities exist” only requires a state to do certain things if it has minorities, 
but it does not require a state to retain territory that includes minorities.  This is the 
difference we saw between territorial revision and ethnic cleansing: Article 27 clearly 
prohibits the killing or expulsion of a minority population, but is silent regarding the 
drawing of a border. 
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the state has some means of ensuring its inhabitants share a common 
civic vision.  States as collective political projects will not work well, 
and will resist granting equal rights, if the individuals constituting 
those states fundamentally doubt each other’s loyalty to the collective 
enterprise’s goals.
Under most conditions, the comprehensive grant of citizenship to 
everyone within the territorial jurisdiction of the state seems like an 
unmitigated good—indeed, the very heart and expression of liberal 
equality principles.99  Yet even though the rhetoric of liberalism 
considers states as mere protectors and service providers for the 
populace (and this is in many ways a very positive vision), as a practical 
matter the state as a political community also requires things of those 
citizens.  Citizenship also brings obligations and costs, and it has—in 
many contexts—strong, emotive aspects.  Citizenship affects taxation, 
military service; it may compel choices about membership in another 
jurisdiction; it encloses the individual in a web of loyalties, duties, and 
obligations that the non-citizen does not have.100  Most poignantly, it 
makes claims on loyalty that, in the extreme case, are the rationale 
behind the punishment of treason: How could one whom the state has 
never embraced possibly betray it?
Citizens will not fulfill those obligations well if they do not
believe in the values of the state.  Liberal stratagems that organize 
loyalty around cosmopolitan sensibilities and commitments to non-
discrimination—like claims about celebrating diversity—brunt up 
against the amorphous but vital need for any community to share some 
values in order to function— indeed in order to feel that functioning is 
even worth the candle.  This extends to mundane matters of governance: 
99 Cf. Diane F. Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 323 (David Wippman, ed., 1998) (“[since] democratic 
values are deeply offended by the exclusion from citizenship of persons long resident 
in a political community ... international law has moved in the direction of establishing 
a presumptive right to citizenship in the state of habitual residence”).
100 In many states—Australia and Switzerland, for instance—citizens are legally 
obliged to vote.
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“A society with a weak sense of any cohesive identity will necessarily 
find it more difficult to organize and sustain the collective responses
that are needed not just to tackle disadvantage, but the welfare state, 
crime and security issues that dominant today’s political agenda[.]”101 
Salman Rushdie—no primordialist—has observed, that “No society, 
no matter how tolerant, can expect to thrive if its citizens don’t 
prize what their citizenship means.”102  The accident of territorial or 
descent-based citizenship cannot ensure the minimum common values 
or loyalty that a political community requires. 
3. A PROXY FOR LOYALTY: THE POLITY’S INTEREST 
IN DETERMINING ITS TERRITORY
Each polity, therefore, has an interest in determining its own 
territory, because territory mediates the links that determines who has 
a claim to citizenship, and thus who must be accorded equality within 
the state.  This implies some ability to define—include and exclude
—populations on the basis of their territorial location, as a proxy for 
affinity or identity.
The solution to the loyalty problem—the problem that a liberal, 
equal-protection state cannot select its citizens by loyalty but is 
nonetheless necessarily and legitimately concerned with questions 
of loyalty and identity—is to reserve for the political community a 
right to construct its frontiers as a proxy for loyalty.  Affinity to place
creates an almost indefeasible claim to citizenship in the state which 
governs that place; and so the state uses territory as a proxy for loyalty, 
withdrawing itself from territories whose population, on balance, does 
101 John Denham, chairman of the UK Labour Party’s home affairs select 
committee, quoted in The Uncomfortable Politics of Identity, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
19, 2006, at 68, available at http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=E1_RDVSGTT (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
102 Id. 
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not share the broader community’s values;103 it withdraws the bond of 
common citizenship which territorial dominion created.104
Is this objectionable?  Nothing in a liberal theory of the citizen 
says citizenship cannot ever be extinguished, and since the community 
represented by the state has its own interests, it is important to ask if we 
really must assign individuals’ claims an absolute privilege.  Citizenship 
is a right, but its instantiation is not static.  If we acknowledge that 
citizenship rests upon an a priori link to territory, then we discover 
a rationale for deciding when changes in citizenship are legitimate: 
when states surrender control over territory on which people live.
If the basis for a claim to citizenship is premised on affinity to
a place, then it can be understood to run with the land, so to speak, 
not necessarily with the state that is currently sovereign.  So long at 
each individual retains a civic link to the sovereign of the place upon 
which his claim is grounded, the incident of a particular, territorially 
defined polity does not preclude reassessment by that polity of its own
identity and raison d’etre, merely because doing so would alter the 
composition of its citizenry—of itself.
4. THE CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNITY
And, as we have seen, this may be so even if that change is opposed 
by the affected citizens or constitutes a harm to them.  Indeed, a key 
mistake in analyzing transfers has been to focus on harm rather than 
the constitution of community—in our case, harm to Israeli Arabs, 
rather than the willingness of Jews to live with them.  I think the 
mistake comes from imagining citizenship as a set of benefits enjoyed
103 Even if one believes that cosmopolitan commitments to equality and diversity 
are sufficient values to ground a community, one must admit that such commitments
are unevenly distributed, and so any given border would yield a polity with more or 
less likely to actually agree on their sufficiency.
104 Note that it withdraws; a state cannot properly acquire territories outside 
itself without the approval of either the present sovereign or the population of that 
territory.
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by atomized individuals, rather than a collective construct requiring 
collective acceptance—much like marriage, dancing, or sex.  No 
one person can insist upon that acceptance; no one, no community 
has an absolute right to remain in union with anyone else or any 
other community.  If the rest of Israel, acting through its democratic 
institutions, wished to alter its union with those territories, how could 
those territories alone prevent that?  That would be no less illiberal 
than for the metropole to deny the wishes of an outer province by 
insisting that it stay in union against its will.105  Is this not precisely the 
logic that moves many to say Palestinians should have their own state 
free of Israel’s control?  Surely the majority—which happens to be 
Jewish—has the same right, a right no less real simply because Israel 
has so consistently overreached the proper bounds of that claim.
Without question, realizing that claim can constitute a harm to 
others.  Yet though such a situation may be wrenching, no one’s right 
is violated, and there is nothing to say about it except that one opposes 
it or wishes it might not come to this—but that is politics, not an 
irrefutable legal claim.  Because it is political, we are free to support or 
oppose transfer.  Yet we all know places where such choices, painful 
as they may be, have been preferable to continued union.  Perhaps, 
today, the land west of Jordan is such a place?  Not so long ago many 
Israelis still desired a single state in Cisjordan, but now, I think, few 
dream of that, and so they have begun to ask themselves where the 
line between them and another people ought to be.  This has required 
them to ask: Who are we?  Which is to say, they are asking: Who are 
we not? 
However humane the impulse, focusing on the interests of—and 
the harm to—Israeli Arabs misses the point: The salient question is the 
willingness of Israelis to live together in a single polity.  If for whatever 
reason a population’s commitment to being a polity is defective, it must 
have some means—some right—to reform itself, and because of our 
105 Illiberal, though not necessary illegal: conventional understandings of self-
determination do give the majority the right to veto proposals for disunion.  
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commitments to equality and citizenship within the state, that revision 
can only express itself externally—that is, territorially.  Everyone who 
accepts Palestinian statehood understands the general instance of this 
point; they presumably only differ on locating the line between the 
two communities.  If Israelis no longer believe in their common bond, 
how can one insist that they maintain it?
B. THE SECESSION OF ISRAEL
The direction of this argument should be clear: It is the legal, 
majoritarian exercise of state sovereignty, but it is also something 
else.  Lieberman talks about “disengagement from Umm el Fahm”—
an opportunistic riff on disengagement from occupied Gaza—but, 
creatively understood, this is an exercise in Jewish self-determination: 
It is the secession of Israel.
1. TERRITORIAL TRANSFER OR SELF-DETERMINATION: FUNCTIONAL 
CONVERGENCE
This is no doctrinal trick.  We should recognize, and take seriously, 
that the transfer of a discrete territory could equally be constructed as 
secession by the rest of the country: Lieberman’s disengagement is a 
democratic exercise of the Israeli state’s sovereign right peacefully to 
alter its borders, but it is also the secession of the Jewish community 
from the broader multiethnic state.  Either way the affected areas would 
not have a veto over the process: International law has not recognized 
the right of a minority to block territorial transfers by the majority, 
and therefore neither has it recognized a veto over withdrawal by the 
majority, which is in effect what the Lieberman Plan achieves.106
106 The only way to defeat the majoritarian turn is to claim that there is something 
necessarily indivisible about the citizenry or the self-determining people.  Such an 
appeal to the General Will sits curiously and uncomfortably with liberal cosmopolitan 
commitments to the individual as the subject of rights—not to mention seeming utterly 
inapposite to states whose populations obviously do not share a common identity.
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When a democratic majority (that also happens to be an ethnic 
group) decides to alter the borders of its—political community (state), 
what functional difference is there between this and self-determination? 
Any democratic majority in Israel can alter the state’s borders,107 
so it has no need to resort to claims of self-determination, yet the 
majoritarian exercise of state sovereignty is functionally identical to 
self-determination.  The mechanics are simple enough: either those 
parts of Israel that do not want to live in community with Umm el 
Fahm exercise their democratic right to cause the state to transfer 
territory to another sovereign, or the Jewish sections of Israel secede 
to form a new state (“Israel Minor”).  (There is no logical reason why a 
transfer must be less than half the territory, nor why secession must be 
a smaller section from a larger.108)  The only difference is that, despite 
identical outcomes, the first method is considered doctrinally sound,
while the latter is not.  Yet when two doctrinal solutions (one favored, 
one not) reach the same functional result, we confront a moment of 
liquefaction, of opportunity, to re-conceive doctrinal categories.
2. A SUBSTANTIVE VIEW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
This is a heterodox view of self-determination.  Conventional 
interpretations have moved away from the doctrine’s earlier, 
Wilsonian engagement with substantive claims about community.109 
107 It would be interesting to imagine the Plan enacted in the Knesset by a majority 
that included Arab deputies—and, if that were acceptable, to ask why it would be 
objectionable if the majority were larger but all Jewish.
108 When Estonia withdrew—seceded—from the Soviet Union, was it “expelling” 
the rest of the country?  It seems ridiculous, but it is quite hard to distinguish the 
two interpretations except by the arbitrary claim that smaller secedes from larger (or 
weaker from more powerful).  Size alone is no reason why the larger, Jewish section 
of Israel could not constitute a candidate for withdrawal.
109 On self-determination generally, see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS chs. 3-4 (1996); 
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Canonical self-determination does not recognize sub-state secession110 
or consider anything but the whole population of an existing territory 
as a meaningful claimant. 
But if there is one place that has resisted this doctrinal narrowing, 
it is Cisjordan.111  The standard narrative of international law assumes 
the state is the appropriate expression of self-determination for its 
population, but nowhere is this assumption less plausible.  The claims 
of Jews and Palestinians are thought comprehensible only in terms of 
organic communities that are separate from and predate the incident of 
territorial delineation.112  Indeed, Israel and Palestine today are perhaps 
the worst possible candidates for objecting to self-determination on 
grounds that it illiberally divides communities on ethnic lines—this is 
precisely what all two-state solutions intend to do.
There is reason to suppose this substantive, pre-territorial 
component of political identity has never fallen entirely out of self-
determination,113 and to recognize its generative value.  Substantive 
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); THE SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT 
WORLD (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2002); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF 
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 2006).
110 The only exceptions are a limited right for communities to secede if subjected 
to extreme violations of rights or denied meaningful participation in governance.  See 
Reference re Secession of Québec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998).
111 Cf. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 386 (2004) 
(justifying a Jewish state on self-defense grounds); CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 433 
(describing Israel as a secession from mandatory Palestine, despite arguing against 
ethnic self-determination).
112 But see Alon Harel, Whose Home Is It? Reflections on the Palestinians’Interest
in Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. IN L. 333 (2004) (discussing the role of territory in 
forming identities for Jews and Palestinians).  Cf. The Future Vision of the Palestinian 
Arabs in Israel, Dialogue no. 6, in BITTERLEMONS-DIALOGUE.ORG, Mar. 2007 (discussion 
between As’ad Ghanem and Asher Susser), available at http://www.bitterlemons-
dialogue.org/dialogue6.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (Susser objecting to the Future 
Vision proposal because it would deny the Jewish nature of the state).
113 See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) (Annex), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. 
A/4864 (Dec. 15, 1960), Principle IV (defining states’ obligations in respect of
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self-determination would move the focus away from existing territorial 
units to engagement with the identities of communities that constitutes 
majorities in a given area—areas defined by the community itself
through a process of self-organization and democratic participation. 
Once new borders were drawn around self-constituting communities, 
those bounded territories would have the same obligations towards the 
diversity within them that any other state has.  Properly understood 
in light of the underlying rationales of political community, a more 
substantive self-determination would also be radically ahistorical, 
according minimal value to claims of historical justice or ancient 
privilege; this would be a valuable feature applied to a conflict in
which historical claims are both omnipresent and utterly unhelpful.
Israeli policy long maintained that the Palestinians were part of the 
Arab people, and thus did not need their own separate state, since the 
Arabs already have several.  Apart from being a heterodox reading of 
a “people” as an organic community—a Wilsonian view that is out 
of step with postwar approaches to—what a “people” is—this rather 
gives away the game of what, on this view, the Jews are too: a self—
determining people.114  And this begs the question not only of what 
that people may legitimately do to preserve “their” state, but also what 
business they have ruling territories on which they do not constitute 
a majority—on which another—people lives—as Israel has done at 
every moment since its founding.  Whether one casts the Lieberman 
Plan as an act of the sovereign will or of self-determination, it brings 
into focus what all two-state plans since partition have implied: If 
any non-self-governing territory “which is geographically separate and is distinct 
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.”).
114 Is there a self-determining Israeli people?  Under conventional international 
law there logically should be, but I think the most charitable thing we can say is that 
Israel presents perhaps one of the weakest proofs for the claim that a state’s population 
constitutes a meaningful people.  Even the most liberal and cosmopolitan of Israelis 
tend to assume that the state must somehow be Jewish.
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the state is to have an ethnic character, it must as much as possible 
withdraw from dominion over other groups.
3. DEPARTURE
For we must note the directionality of this process: self-
determination means Israel withdrawing; it is Israel—the Jewish 
political community—that must sacrifice claim to territory.  That would
sound strange to a Zionist intent on building the state, but modern 
self-determination involves withdrawal from some broader political 
community.  This implies two important things about the shape of a 
resolution.
It means, first, that Israel as a state cannot unilaterally take further 
territory.  No international norm validates Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank, including East Jerusalem,115 and the logic of transfer 
is inapposite to the occupied territory of another people.  So while 
it would be possible to structure a deal between two sovereigns to 
transfer Jewish settlements to Israel, there is no obligation on Palestine 
to do so.  To the degree the Plan is conceived as both a reduction in 
Israel’s Arab population and an increase in its Jewish population from 
the West Bank, it overreaches what the Israeli side can legitimately 
achieve on its own.
The logic of self-determination as I have described it may, on 
the other hand, be available to the settlers themselves.  Along with 
overcoming doctrinal resistance from the conventional view of self-
determination, this would require them to defeat claims that their 
presence constitutes an illegal occupation, but if self-determination 
is understood as a radically ahistorical doctrine, then over time past 
claims fade before demographic realities.  The Jews are there, and 
perhaps they should withdraw; but if they do not, at some point their 
115 Israel denies that the West Bank is occupied territory, styling it rather an 
“administered area,” (available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/arab-israel.html 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007)), but this view is broadly rejected.
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claim to what they have taken and possessed as a majority—though 
no more—might be made as of right.  That community could then, if it 
wished (as it surely would), form a common polity with Jewish Israel. 
Of course, this same logic would be available to Israel’s Arabs, if they 
wished to join Palestine.116
But either scenario—a (Jewish) majority in Israel democratically 
redefining its territory or Jews as a community exercising a right of
self-determination—involves the withdrawal of (Israeli or Jewish) 
control from territory with whose communities they feel no common 
political bond.  Whether one employs the conventional rationale of 
the lex lata or the interpretation I propose, there is no legitimate way 
to employ the language of self-determination to advance Zionism’s 
physical border beyond where it has already gone, beyond what it has 
already conquered and displaced.117
And I think the project of Zionism has reached, and reaches today, 
far beyond even its willingness and ability to actually make the land 
Jewish, though at times its ruthless ambition has been breathtaking. 
Eretz Yisrael is not a land without a people, to be filled in with
immigrants as they arrive or through “natural growth”; the only 
legitimate Israel is one shaped by where the Jewish people already are 
in majority.  Yet, while fearing that they might be driven into the sea, 
116 For those Israeli Jews whose civic horror of the Plan rests, even in part, on 
Israeli Arabs’ opposition to transfer, it would be interesting to consider what opinion 
they would have if the Arabs actually did want to separate and become part of 
Palestine.  Because, of course, some do.  See, e.g., Daniel Pipes, Palestinians Who 
Prefer Israel, JERUSALEM POST, January 1, 2008, available at http://www.jpost.com/
servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1198517266741 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2008) (reporting on surveys showing 62 percent of Israeli Arabs 
“want to remain Israeli citizens and 14 percent want to join a future Palestinian state. 
Asked, ‘Do you support transferring the Triangle…to the Palestinian Authority?’  78 
percent oppose the idea and 18 percent support it.”).
117 I do not wish to enter the pointless debate over the historical provenance of 
Palestinian Arab and Jewish settlement in Cisjordan.  It should be obvious that my 
argument draws no conclusions about the legitimacy of either community’s presence 
or about contemporary governance from historical narratives.
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the Jews of Israel have found themselves on the banks of Jordan and 
in the suburbs of Beirut.
Although abhorred by many, the Lieberman Plan is, in its way, 
firmly in the mainstream of Israeli opinion, sharing the premises of
all two-state solutions.118  Indeed, it distinguishes itself most in its 
clarity and its willingness to surrender something Israel possesses 
incontrovertibly.  From its founding, Israel has maintained a studied, 
opportunistic ambiguity about its borders.119  That Lieberman—whom 
118 The Israeli left argued for a two-state solution long before the right accepted the 
premise.  See Gershom Gorenberg, The Minister for National Fears, 299(4) ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 84 (May 2007);  Ben Lynfield, The Rise of Avigdor Lieberman, THE NATION, 
Dec. 14, 2006, available at www.thenation.com/doc/20070101/lynfield (last visited
Nov. 18, 2007) (“The left wing, for its part, has for many years used the phrase 
‘demographic problem’ to describe Arabs.”).  Ostensibly the left was concerned with 
the democratic and Jewish soul of the state—and the rights of Palestinians, let us 
never forget them—but it never fully grappled with the ethnic logic of its position. 
A glance at the maps of the Geneva Initiative—a group which holds Lieberman in 
horrified contempt—shows that its proposed border aims to put land containing as
many Jews and as few Palestinians as possible into Israel.  That the Initiative would 
not denationalize any Israeli Arabs while otherwise insisting on maximum separation 
seems a rather thin distinction; Lieberman has stripped that away.
119 That ambiguity also has implications for constructing citizenship.  Cf. Ilan 
Jonas, A Free People in Our Land: The Status of the Arab Sector in Israel, ISRAEL 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Facts+about+Israel-+The+State/A+Free+People+in+Our+Land-+The+Arab+Sector.
htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2007)  (“Upon its establishment in 1948, Israel...declared 
its aspiration to be a free and equal society and formally extended a hand in peace 
to the minorities found within its borders, as well as to its Arab neighbors.”)  This 
formulation, which mirrors the Declaration of Independence, leaves open where 
Israel’s borders are, and with it who is a minority “within its borders” and who a 
“neighbor.” Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, Israel, The Territories and International Law: When 
Doves are Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONGST THE NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL’S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 390 (Alfred E. Kellermann, Kurt 
Siehr, & Talia Einhorn eds., 1998) (“You exercise control over the territory... but 
you are able to deny the local citizens any political rights since they do not become 
citizens of the occupying State—and all this with the penumbra of legality…Legally 
you get the land without the people”).
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many view as a profoundly hateful man, and one whose very presence 
in Israel is a direct consequence of that expansive policy —should be 
the one to indicate the high-water mark within which Zionism might 
finally contain itself, from which it will withdraw to democratically
defensible frontiers, is an indictment of the real poverty and myopia 
that has beset Israel’s famously vigorous political conversation.  At 
least the Plan assumes, rightly, that a discussion of democracy and 
Jewishness is incomplete if territory is left out of the equation: What 
creates that demographic conundrum in its fullest form is the insistence 
on a democratic and Jewish Israel in its present borders, which in effect 
reach to the Jordan.  The Jewish people may have a right to preserve 
their state, yet there is no reason that state must encompass as much 
as it does; indeed, if democracy truly endangered Israel’s Jewishness, 
then the right response is not more immigration, not continued 
occupation and new settlements and the Iron Wall, but withdrawal to 
a demographically defensible frontier.120  The Lieberman Plan may be 
the rankest pretext for Jewish chauvinism—though are not all two-
state solutions fundamentally about preserving a Jewish state?—but at 
120 Cf. Ruthie Blum, ‘I Didn’t Suggest We Kill Palestinians, JERUSALEM POST, 
Oct. 11, 2007, available at www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost
%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1191257273616 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) 
(interview with Arnon Soffer, saying, inter alia, “‘I didn’t recommend that we 
kill Palestinians.  I said we’ll have to kill them.’”) (emphasis in original).  Even 
Israelis less hardened than Soffer assume Jews must either annex land or be 
evacuated; few contemplate leaving Jews under Palestinian authority. (The FIPS 
report, for example, assumes Israel will keep most West Bank settlements and 
Arab-populated land giving access to them.)  Israelis assume as a matter of course 
that a final deal will leave a Jewish society with an Arab minority, but not the other
way round.  And because evacuation is so inhumane, inevitably it is prescribed 
for only small populations—never for the bulk of the West Bank settlers—which 
predetermines a final deal in favor of expanding Israel.  Cf. David M. Phillips, 
The Unexplored Option: Jewish Settlements in a Palestinian State, BEPRESS LEGAL 
SERIES, paper 1171 (2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1171 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
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least it acknowledges the directionality that project must adopt.121
Has a more liberal and cosmopolitan Israel been prepared to offer 
more, offer anything?  Has it acknowledged that the only normatively 
defensible Jewish democracy must seek its level in something less? 
Have those whom David Grossman calls “thinking people” and “the 
decisive majority” actually placed on the table what Israel has already 
embraced and said they are prepared to give it up?122  I think no Arab 
believes that Israel has ever made, in any way, a generous or a radical 
offer.123  And if, reading this now, you think to yourself, “But when 
121 Lieberman’s candor perhaps exceeds his creativity: His proposal clearly 
rules out any territorial withdrawal from the Old City or the “Holy Basin,” any 
corridor from Gaza to the West Bank, or any refugee returns into Israel.  See Yisrael 
Beytenu, The Strategic Threats—The Red Lines—Principles for the Permanent 
Agreement—Introduction, available at http://www.beytenu.org/121/1252/article.
html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  And although his proposals implicitly invoke the 
trilemma of democracy, Jewish identity, and territory, his own politics indicate a clear 
prioritization.  See Lynfield, The Rise of Avigdor Lieberman, supra note 118 (quoting 
Lieberman saying, in Sept. 2007, “I very much favor democracy, but when there is a 
contradiction between democratic and Jewish values, the Jewish and Zionist values 
are more important.”).
122 David Grossman, Looking at Ourselves, 54 N.Y. REV. BOOKS Jan. 11, 2007, at 
4, (Haim Watzman, trans.), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19770 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2008).  (“All thinking people, in Israel and in Palestine, know deep 
in their hearts the difference between...  their dreams and wishes, and... what they can 
get at the end of the negotiations”); id. at 6 (“The decisive majority of Israel’s citizens 
now understand—of course, some of them without enthusiasm—…that the land will 
be divided, that there will be a Palestinian state”).
123 Here is an example of a radical offer—radical, at least, given the constricted 
nature of the debate: When Israelis discuss the ‘48 refugees that debate ranges 
from symbolically acknowledging suffering, to admitting a few tens of thousands, 
to refusing to admit even a single one.  Meantime, since 1990 Israel has absorbed 
a million Russian Jews with no more connection to Cisjordan—or often, even to 
Judaism—than I have.  Never have Israelis seriously contemplated significant returns,
assuming that to do so would be demographic suicide.  But if Israel were to enact 
the Lieberman Plan and admit into its new frontiers a number of ’48 refugees equal 
to its Russian immigrants, Jews would still outnumber Arabs three to one.  An offer 
to admit a million refugees might have broken the impasse at Camp David and Taba 
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have the Arabs been generous to Israel?”—well, you are right, but you 
also prove the point.
In claiming beyond itself, Israel and its Jews have encompassed 
but not embraced another people, and this has been, I think, the 
original and continuing sin of Zionism.  But that origin is history; it 
is the continuation that requires a decision.  Israel, as a Jewish state, 
is far more in control of its demography and its destiny than those it 
occupies, and so Israel—I mean the Jews—must decide if it wishes to 
continue to live with this other among it, and if so, decide to do those 
things that, as both law and reason tell us, living together requires.
III. WITHDRAWAL: THE STATE IS THE DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT
[I]t does not suffice to open your doors when the
other doors are bolted.  You permit our going out, but 
nobody allows our coming in….If it became apparent 
that it was impossible to come to an agreement with 
His Majesty the Sultan, if his unbending will shut 
us out of Palestine, then, still solemnly asserting our 
undying historical claims to the land of our fathers…
we should have to be patient and wait.  We can afford 
to wait. 
Max Nordau, Address at the Sixth Zionist Congress 
(The ‘Uganda’ Congress), 1903124
while preserving a Jewish, democratic state—and Palestinians might even fail to fill
the quota (see Hassan M. Fattah, For Many Palestinians, ‘Return’ Is Not a Goal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2007).  Of course, such an idea is ludicrous—but that simply indicates 
the contours of Israeli opinion. That Jewish Israel would have no demographically 
defensible borders if all the refugees returned simply indicates the enormity of the 
displacement the Zionist project has created in Cisjordan—and consequently the need 
for Israel and its Jews to make enormous and profound concessions.
124 Max Nordau, “Address at the Sixth Zionist Congress,” Basel, Aug. 24, 1903, 
available at http://www.geocities.com/Vienna/6640/zion/nordau6.html (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2007).
60
Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 2 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol2/iss1/art9
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1021
Transfer may be a terrible idea.  Certainly the moral discomfort that 
attaches even to discussion of this kind of thing is almost visceral.  I 
am not trying to defend the Lieberman Plan or any other transfer.  As I 
wrote the first draft of this, I had never even been to Israel, so what do I
know about it?  I have sought rather to consider the broader normative 
framework:  That framework shows transfer is probably defensible, 
either in law as an expression of majority will directing the policy of 
the state, or, logically, as an expression of the self-determining will of 
a self-defining community.  My argument shows that the proper realm
for contesting the question of transfer is the political, not the legal—at 
most, the international legal framework is unclear, which normally 
indicates, in practice, permission.
So it is best to recognize that and instead consider the underlying, 
conflicting norms: That means those who oppose the Plan must
mobilize moral and political reasons, and likewise those who favor 
it.  Those who are horrified by the Lieberman Plan but also advocate
a two-state solution should acknowledge the deep affinities between
their approaches.  It is a serious thing to change the borders of a state 
and to reject a political community, even one as fractious and unhappy 
as that between Israel’s Jews and its Arabs.  Simply because one can, 
legally, pursue the Plan, does not mean that one must, or even that one 
should. 
My argument is not about which choice to make, but about the 
choosing.  It suggests that Jews have a legitimate claim to define their
homeland, subject to important limits arising out of Palestinians’ 
legitimate claim to define theirs; the reverse is also true.  It suggests
too that Israel’s citizens—and Palestine’s—can redefine or reject their
common identity.  One might hope they would choose a common 
future—still, it is for the Jews or Palestinians to decide about the 
wisdom or folly of such a future.  That is perhaps the point: I think 
they are, each, free to choose—though for a long time now, it is the 
Jews who have been freer to act.
This is not a withdrawal from liberal principles or a capitulation 
before religious chauvinism or ethnic hatred.  It is, undoubtedly, 
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the abandonment of an enforced ideal of individualism and 
cosmopolitanism that insists equality and non-discrimination are 
sufficient to motivate any political configuration regardless of the
views of those actually configured.  It represents, in this sense,
pragmatism about what one can, and should, ask of a polity.  If my 
argument has its own ideal, it is respect for the decisional autonomy 
of human beings to define their own identity and community, and to
draw the political consequences—and borders—for themselves. 
It is therefore also an assertion that focusing on egregious efforts 
to alter demography as violations of law often distracts us from the 
most powerful determinant of demography: the state itself, with its 
control of territory.  International law has found no effective means 
to regulate the demographic effects of mere sovereignty.  Rather, it 
engages in a reactive, post hoc response to symptomatic excesses of 
sovereign control.  Human rights police the excesses of “pathological 
homogenization,”125 but not the background processes which legitimate 
states’ power to define their demography.  For all its success in limiting
sovereignty, human rights has never developed a vocabulary to define,
let alone delegitimate, the quotidian processes of homogenization: the 
use of official language, the teaching of common history, patterned
bias in planning decisions and resource allocation, the construction 
of patriotic symbolism, and on and on.  Even democracy allows the 
majority to define the agenda, the definitions, and the very meaning
of statehood, in a way which the idea of rights neither reaches nor 
comprehends.126 
125 HEATHER RAE, STATE IDENTITIES AND THE HOMOGENISATION OF PEOPLES (2002).
126 Consider this analysis from FIPS, which of course is opposed to transfer as 
an illiberal abandonment of equality principles.  In a serious dialogue, FIPS  argues, 
Israel’s Jews: 
Will have to address their responsibility for the equation of the 
relations between their community and the Jewish population, 
which perceives the Arabs as a foreign body in their own homeland 
and state. 
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The modern Jewish presence in Cisjordan is the locus classicus of 
this process: from being a minority on the eve of independence, Jews, 
through the instruments of the state, have systematically engineered 
an overwhelming Jewish majority within that state’s territory.127 
The initial refugee flights—whether caused by Israel or not—are
only part of that process,128 which has involved discrimination, 
sponsored immigration,129 conquest and settlement of territory, and 
Our recommendation is not to fear this debate. However, it 
must also be understood that it is not part of the debate regarding 
the peace process and the borders of the state. Rather, it is part 
of the central debate relating to the character of the state, the 
relationship between its ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ aspects, and the 
historic duality of the conduct towards the Arab minority in the 
state.
ARIELI & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 94-5.  This view is sympathetic to Israeli 
Arabs. Yet notice the presumption and preemption: why must this debate be understood 
as one within the state, and not about it?  Such a position ensures the debate cannot 
reach that question even if its participants want to, and—more to the point—that the 
discussion will be one-sided, its outcomes circumscribed.  Israeli Arabs value their 
citizenship, but can anyone doubt that if they were the majority, they would have a 
very different conversation with Israel’s Jews?
127 Jews constituted a majority within the UN partition plan’s proposed Jewish 
state, but a minority in the territory which became Israel after the 1948 war.
128 Cf. Scott Wilson, Israel Revisited, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 2007, at D1, D7 
(quoting “new historian” Benny Morris: “If [Ben-Gurion] was already driving out 
people, maybe he should have gone the whole hog….Perhaps in the end population 
exchanges and transfers, although they may have caused great suffering at the time, 
may in the long run have been better for everyone concerned.”).
129 Israel’s immigration policy is instructive: Israel has long relied on large-
scale temporary workforces from the West Bank and Gaza, implying a structural 
employment gap Arabs are willing to fill. Yet Israel prevents individual Palestinians
from immigrating, while at the same time aggressively recruiting Jewish immigrants 
and unskilled workers from Thailand, the Philippines, and other developing countries, 
to replace Palestinian workers shut out by restrictive policies in place since the second 
Intifada.  See, e.g., Martin Asser, Israeli Anger Over ‘Nazi’ Group, BBC NEWS, Sept. 
10, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6987848.stm (last 
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every imaginable facet of governance.130  In such a context, the 
physical boundaries of state control have been critical to defining the
demographic majority, which in turn defines the identity of the state.
The response of liberalism to the demographic power of the state—
trusting to cosmopolitan principles and human rights to police states’ 
majoritarian instincts; relying on formalistic theories of civic identity 
to motivate citizenship; supporting territorial integrity but not means of 
flexible revision—too often leave no means to ameliorate repression,
resolve conflicts arising out of radically different visions for a single
polity or piece of land, or offer escape.  Those without the means to 
participate are locked in; majorities are locked in too, but the prison-
house of the nation is less painful if one is the warden.
Minorities are not helpless before the power of the ethnicized state; 
efforts to reform (or destroy) particular identities often fail or backfire. 
(Israel’s sustained repression of the residents of the Occupied Territories 
has only reinforced their identity as Palestinians.)  Still, states possess, 
and exercise, tremendous resources for shaping demographic shifts; 
although it is rare to extinguish a vibrant, nationally conscious 
visited Nov. 18, 2007) (discussing immigration of former Soviet Jews and that “[s]ome 
of the immigrants are thought to have only the most tenuous links to Judaism”); Amos 
Oz, Free at Last, YNET NEWS, May 2005, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-3130842,00.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  The result has been 
a spectacularly—if to some still insufficiently—successful demographic shift in favor
of Jews in the migration pool.
130 The ownership structure of land in Cisjordan has changed dramatically since 
independence: in 1947, Jews owned, at most, eight percent of the land, while Arabs 
owned just under half and possibly considerably more. Institute for Palestine Studies, 
A SURVEY OF PALESTINE: PREPARED IN DECEMBER, 1945 AND JANUARY, 1946 FOR THE 
INFORMATION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY 244 (1946), Table 1 (“Areas 
Purchased by Jews, 1920-1945,” available at http://www.palestineremembered.com/
Articles/A-Survey-of-Palestine/Story6685.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008); “Palestine, 
Land Ownership by Sub-districts,” (map) (1945), available at http://domino.un.org/
maps/m0094.jpg (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).  Today, Jewish or Israeli state control 
of land is the norm, and mostly this has been done through legal means, even as the 
demographic balance has dramatically shifted in the Jews’ favor.
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community, it is rarer still that a majority culture in a state is ever 
seriously threatened by other identities.  So when a majority feels 
threatened, withdrawal is the only ethically acceptable defense for 
the powerful—clearly, I mean the Jews—to ensure their continued 
dominance in a territory of their own; just as it is the opportunity for 
the weak—unquestionably, the Palestinians—to take up the tools of 
the state, for which they have so long waited, and define their own
destiny.
See, land, that we were most wasteful. 
– Shaul Tchernichowski, 1938131
It is not wrong to conclude that two peoples have separate identities, 
with different destinies.  The nation is a daily plebiscite, Renan said,132 
and we might add that, in asking each day “are we a nation,” the 
answer is not always yes.  And so, on the day when the answer is no, 
we two are not one, neither is it wrong then to ask what should result, 
however difficult such questions are.  What does seem clearly wrong,
in answering, is to tell the other, “Because you are no part of me, you 
must go—and leave your land behind.”  No, it is they who reach that 
conclusion who must make the sacrifice; it is they who must depart.
131 Quoted in Grossman, supra note 122, at 4.
132 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’ une nation?” (lecture at the Sorbonne), Mar. 11, 
1882, 1 OEUVRES COMPLETES 887-907, available in translation at http://www.cooper.
edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
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